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Background / New Mideast peace bids - A pocket guide

Ha'aretz, December 10, 2003

By Bradley Burston, Haaretz Correspondent

Without warning, a drought in Middle East peacemaking has yielded to a flash flood of unofficial initiatives, trial balloons and truce bids, all of them intended as alternatives or supplements to the road map, and prompting wide speculation over the shape of an eventual solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Here, in summary and comparison, are a number of the most recent plans

GENEVA ACCORD

An unofficial model for a future permanent peace agreement, the self-styled final stage of the U.S.-EU-UN-Russian-backed road map peace plan

STRIKING FEATURES: Palestinians would effectively if not explicitly renounce the right of return of refugees to Israeli territory, and Israel would concede sovereignty over the Temple Mount, or Noble Sanctuary

BACKGROUND: Under the plan, unveiled in October after more than two years of discussion between Palestinian officials and Israeli opposition leaders, an independent Palestine would arise on nearly the whole of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

In return for full Israeli recognition, Palestine would explicitly recognize Israel as a Jewish state, and end all violence and incitement against it

The sovereign territory of Palestine would encompass nearly all existing settlements, including Ariel, Efrat, Kiryat Arba, Ofra, Elon Moreh, Bet El, Eli and Har Homa, and all Gaza Strip enclaves

The exceptions would include Maaleh Adumim, the Etzion bloc excluding Efrat, a number of Jewish neighborhoods in the north of Jerusalem, and a strip near Latrun, intended for defense of Ben-Gurion International Airport. An equivalent small area of the Israeli western Negev would be appended to Palestinian Gaza

According to the plan, "Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force" for law enforcement. An international force would be deployed for supervision of implementation.

Jerusalem would be physically divided, with Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and the Old City to become the capital of Palestine, and western and northern Jewish neighborhoods of the city, as well as the Old City's Jewish Quarter to be the capital of Israel

The Temple Mount or Noble Sanctuary would be under Palestinian sovereignty, the Western Wall under Israeli

Although it refers to the controversial UN Resolution 194 and the Saudi peace initiative as part of the basis of a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, Israeli proponents and Palestinian opponents say the Geneva plan would effectively end Arab demands for a right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper, by granting Israel the authority to decide how many could come back

Based on the Clinton Plan - the series of far-reaching proposals brokered by then-president Bill Clinton after the collapse of the Camp David peace summit in July 2000 - the accord, which received key funding and sponsorship by the Swiss foreign ministry, was formally launched on November 30 at a gala ceremony in Geneva

PRINCIPAL AUTHORS: Ex-Palestinian information minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and former Israeli justice

Minister Yossi Beilin

ENDORSEMENTS: British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Mohammed of Morocco, former U.S. president Bill Clinton, Nobel peace laureates Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Lech Walesa of Poland and ex-U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

CRITICS: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Labor predecessor Ehud Barak, nearly the whole of the Israeli right and a sizable portion of the center-left Labor Party; the militant Palestinian Hamas movement, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, an armed militia wing of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement

CURRENT STATUS Soon after its formal launch, the plan was given a boost when U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited Beilin and Abed Rabbo for separate talks last Friday

Following his meeting, Powell said that while "We welcome other ideas," the administration remained solely committed to the road map. Annan's response was similar.

American officials said the Geneva Accord would not alter the text of the road map, which is more phased than the unofficial plan, and whose interim stages require such steps as strong PA action against terrorism and substantive Israeli curbs on settlement construction.

Israel remains on record as strongly opposing the Geneva Accord, calling it subversive and dangerous. A Haaretz poll of Israelis published this month found that 31.2 percent of Israelis approved of the accord, while 37.7 percent opposed it. A separate poll taken in October showed that only 25 percent of Israelis had backed the accord, while 54 percent were opposed. A large number of respondents in the recent poll said they had yet to make up their minds, or had learned little about the Accord.

Yasser Arafat, believed to have been behind many of the Accord's provisions, has given ambivalent support, but has undercut the plan's backers by emphasizing Resolution 194, which many Palestinians cite as the grounds for a right of return, a concept anathema to Israelis.

The Geneva Initiative – Summary and Key Points
By Gidon D. Remba, President, Chicago Peace Now, and Marc Swetlitz

"We, the undersigned, a group of Palestinians and Israelis, endorse, on this day October 12, 2003, a model draft framework final status agreement between the two peoples. At this point in time, after the Palestinian government and the Israeli government have accepted the Road Map, which includes reaching a final-status settlement by 2005, based on a two state solution, we consider it to be of the utmost importance to present to the two peoples and the entire world an example of what such a final status agreement could include. This is proof that despite all the pain entailed in concessions, it is possible to reach a historical compromise which meets the vital national interests of each side."
(From the cover letter signed by Israeli and Palestinian participants)

Principal Palestinian signatories:

Former Minister of Information and Culture Yasser Abed-Rabbo; Former Minister of Tourism Nebil Qassis; Palestinian Legislative Council members Qadoura Fares and Mohamed Horani, associated with the Fatah/Tanzim; Samih al-Abed; Bashar Jum'a; Dr. Nazmi Shuabi; Gheith al-Omri, from the PLO Negotiations Support Unit; Jamal Zakut; Prisoners Affairs Minister Hisham Abdel Raziq; Ghadi Jarei, member of the Prisoners Committee and Fatah; Nazmi Jub'e; General Zoheir Manesra, former governor of Jenin and head of Preventative Security in the West Bank.

Principal Israeli signatories:

Former IDF Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak; Brigadier General (res.) Giora Inbar, a former division commander in Lebanon; Brigadier General (res.) Gideon Sheffer, former director of the IDF Personnel Branch and deputy director of the National Security Council; Brigadier General (res.) Shlomo Brom, former head of the strategy staff; Colonel (res.) Shaul Arieli; former Justice Minister Yossi Beilin; Member of Knesset (Labor) Amram Mitzna; Member of Knesset (Labor) and former Speaker of the Knesset Avraham Burg; Former Minister of Immigrant Absorption and Member of Knesset (Labor) Yuli Tamir; Member of Knesset (Meretz) and former Minister of Agriculture Haim Oron; Member of Knesset (Meretz) and former Minister of Education Yossi Sarid; Professor Aryeh Amon (a leader of Peace Now); former Member of Knesset (Likud) Neheme Ronan; authors Amos Oz, David Grossman, and Zvia Greenfield; Jerusalem expert Dr. Menechem Klein; and economist Yoram Gabay.

The following is a summary of key points in the Geneva Initiative:

Preamble: This agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties' respective citizens. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.

Article 1 – Purpose: The implementation of this Agreement will settle all of the claims of the Parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.

Article 4 – Borders & Settlements: The border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis. Approximately 97.5% of the West Bank and 100% of Gaza will become part of Palestine, plus 2.5% of Israel from two areas: one area near Gaza to widen the Gaza Strip by 90 square kilometers, and another area adjacent to the southern West Bank. All of the 2.5% of West Bank territory that will become part of Israel comes from around Jerusalem. (See below for more on Jerusalem)

- The state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory. Israel shall keep intact the immovable property, infrastructure and facilities in Israeli settlements to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. The value of Israeli fixed assets that remain intact shall be deducted from Israel's contribution to the International Fund established to compensate Palestinian refugees (see below). In addition to

evacuating settlers from most smaller settlements, a number of large settlements will also be left for the Palestinian state, including Ariel, Efrat, Kiryat Arba, Ofra, Elon Morah, Bet El, Eli and Har Homa. Israel will absorb settlements blocs that contain 110,000 settlers, in addition to the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem which include 200,000 Israelis. 110,000 Israelis living in 120 out of 140 West Bank settlements, and all settlements in the Gaza Strip, will be evacuated.

- The states of Palestine and Israel will establish a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The corridor, which will traverse Israeli territory, will be under Palestinian administration and under Israeli sovereignty, and it will be permanently open.

Articles 3 & 5 – Implementation & Security: An International Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) – including the US, Russia, the EU, the UN and others – and a Multinational Force (MF) in Palestine will be established to provide security guarantees to both parties, act as a deterrent, and to help insure implementation and to monitor compliance by both parties to the terms of the agreement.

- Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force. The MF will protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine and oversee the Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory. The MF will help enforce anti-terrorism measures, monitor Palestinian security compliance, and train the Palestinian Security Service. The force cannot be withdrawn except by consent of both Israel and Palestine.
- Existing irregular forces and armed groups shall be disbanded and prevented from reforming at any future date. A Trilateral Security Committee – including Israel, Palestine, and the US – shall develop comprehensive policies and guidelines to fight terrorism and violence. Israel and Palestine will promulgate laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence and vigorously enforce them and the IVG shall monitor compliance.
- Israeli military forces and settlers will be removed from Palestinian territory within 30 months.
- Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF for an additional 36 months. Israel may maintain two Early Warning Stations (EWS) in the northern and central West Bank at locations specified in the Agreement. The EWS will be staffed by the minimal required number of Israeli personnel and will use the minimal amount of land necessary for their operation. The MF will monitor and verify that the EWS is being used for purposes recognized by the Accord.
- All border crossings in the State of Palestine will be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the Palestinian Security Force and the Multinational Force. There will be no Israeli forces at border crossings between the state of Palestine and the Arab world following the 30-month Israeli withdrawal process; during the 30-month withdrawal period, Israel will be able to maintain only an unseen presence at a designated facility in passenger and cargo terminals.
- The Palestinian state will enjoy sovereignty and security control over all roads in its territory.
- The state of Palestine will enjoy sovereignty over its own airspace. The Israeli Air Force will be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes.

Article 6 – Jerusalem: Israel and Palestine shall have their mutually recognized capitals in areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.

- Israel will receive sovereignty over the "Wailing" Wall, the Jewish Quarter of

the Old City, and Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, including Givat Ze'ev, Ma'aleh Adumim, and the original historically Jewish area of Gush Etzion. Israel shall administer the Tower of David, the Western Wall tunnel, and the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives.

- Palestine will receive sovereignty over al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (the "Compound"), the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian Quarters of the Old City, and the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.
- An International Group, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of the terms of the agreement regarding the Compound. The Compound will be open to people of all faiths, with the Multinational Force ensuring freedom of access to the site. In view of the sanctity of the Compound, and in light of the unique religious and cultural significance of the site to the Jewish people, there shall be no digging, excavation, or construction on the Compound, unless approved by the two Parties.

Article 7 – Palestinian Refugees: The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them. The Parties recognize that UN General Assembly Resolution 194, UN Security Council Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled under the Accord.

- All Palestinian refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property.
- Refugees will be given the choice to (1) move to the new Palestinian state, including areas formerly in Israel [unlimited numbers], (2) remain in the countries where they currently reside or move to a third country [numbers based on sovereign decision of the host country], or (3) move to Israel [numbers based on the sovereign decision of Israel]. In determining its numbers, Israel will consider the average of the numbers submitted by other countries. Refugees who opt to remain in countries where they now reside will also receive prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for their communities.
- An international commission and international fund will be established to deal with implementation of these residence options and compensation. Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Israel will contribute an agreed amount based on the value of the loss of property resulting from the refugees' displacement. Refugee status of individual Palestinians will be terminated once a permanent residence option has been realized.

Article 10 – Sites of Religious Significance: Israel and Palestine shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, which will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs, Rachel's Tomb, and Nebi Samuel.

Article 11 – Palestinian Prisoners & Detainees: All Palestinian and Arab prisoners detained in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prior to the date of signature of the agreement shall be released according to a three-phase plan as outlined in the agreement—some immediately, some within 18 months, and "exceptional cases" in 30 months.

Article 17 - End of Conflict: The Parties agree that the Geneva Accord will replace and supplant all UN resolutions, including those dealing with refugees, as well as other previous agreements. The Parties request that the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly endorse the Accord and declare that it supercedes all previous UN







resolutions.


"For the first time in more than a 100 years of conflict a detailed and comprehensive solution was agreed upon which settles the most critical issues to the [Palestinian-Israeli] conflict, such as borders, ending occupation, the future of Jerusalem and its holy places, and the Palestinians refugees, thus addressing the roots of the conflict, and leaving no room for further claims by the parties in the future....The participants have proven by this draft agreement that there are partners for peace on both sides and that a peace agreement is possible. These understandings can radically change the mood of pessimism and despair, create emotional and political momentum and bring into every Israeli and every Palestinian home the sense of hope, confidence, security, and human dignity. With this agreement years of conflict can finally give way to the dawn of a new era." From the participants' press release, Oct. 11, 2003

A full-text version of the Geneva Initiative can be found [here](#). For maps, see [http://www.peacenow.org/Map%20of%20the%20Geneva%20Initiative%20-%20proposed%20borders](#) (proposed borders), [http://www.peacenow.org/Map%20of%20the%20Geneva%20Initiative%20-%20territorial%20exchange](#) (territorial exchange), and [http://www.peacenow.org/Map%20of%20the%20Geneva%20Initiative%20-%20Old%20City%20of%20Jerusalem](#) (Old City of Jerusalem)

Final Status Map Presented by Israel – Taba, January 2001

Based on a 5% – West Bank Territorial Transfer to Israel


-  Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Areas A and B)
-  Brown Area
Palestinian Sovereignty
-  White Area: Israeli Sovereignty
Settlement Built-up Areas
-  No Man's Land as defined in
Armistice Agreement 1949
-  Israeli territory offered as part
of a 3:1 land swap
-  Israeli Settlements within
Brown Areas



A Palestinian State – Historical Comparison



<http://www.fmep.org>



This map was presented by the Israeli team at Taba, January 2001, several weeks before the elections.

The most noticeable change, is the disappearance of the "temporary Israeli Control" zones.

The Palestinians accepted the Taba map as a basis for negotiations, although the settlement blocs look stranger in shape and less justifiable than ever.

However, by this time Barak was a "Political corpse". All surveys predicted his unprecedented defeat. He did not dare to present this map to the Israeli public.

After all, the man who constantly declared: "Ofra and Beit-El forever!", could not present a map passing these settlements to Palestinian

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Feature

Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors

By

Mr. Malley, as Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs, was a member of the US peace team and participated in the Camp David summit. Mr. Agha has been involved in Palestinian affairs for more than thirty years and during this period has had an active part in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

In accounts of what happened at the July 2000 Camp David summit and the following months of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we often hear about Ehud Barak's unprecedented offer and Yasser Arafat's uncompromising no. Israel is said to have made a historic, generous proposal, which the Palestinians, once again seizing the opportunity to miss an opportunity, turned down. In short, the failure to reach a final agreement is attributed, without notable dissent, to Yasser Arafat.



Yasir Arafat
(click for larger image)

As orthodoxies go, this is a dangerous one. For it has larger ripple effects. Broader conclusions take hold. That there is no peace partner is one. That there is no possible end to the conflict with Arafat is another.

For a process of such complexity, the diagnosis is remarkably shallow. It ignores history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationships among the three parties. In so doing, it fails to capture why what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer. Worse, it acts as a harmful constraint on American policy by offering up a single, convenient culprit—Arafat—rather than a more nuanced and realistic analysis.

1.

Each side came to Camp David with very different perspectives, which led, in turn, to highly divergent approaches to the talks.

Ehud Barak was guided by three principles. First was a deep antipathy toward the concept of gradual steps that lay at the heart of the 1993 Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. In his view, the withdrawals of Israeli forces from parts of Gaza and the West Bank during the preceding seven years had forced Israel to pay a heavy price without getting anything tangible in return and without knowing the scope of the Palestinians' final demands. A second axiom for Barak was that the Palestinian leadership would make a historic compromise—if at all—only after it had explored and found unappealing all other possibilities.

An analysis of Israeli politics led to Barak's third principle. Barak's team was convinced that the Israeli public would ratify an agreement with the Palestinians, even one that entailed far-reaching concessions, so long as it was final and brought quiet and normalcy to the country. But Barak and his associates also felt that the best way to bring the agreement before the Israeli public was to minimize any political friction along the way. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had paid a tremendous political (and physical) price by alienating the Israeli right wing and failing to bring its members along during

the Oslo process. Barak was determined not to repeat that mistake. Paradoxically, a government that believed it enjoyed considerable latitude concerning the terms of the ultimate deal felt remarkably constrained on the steps it could take to get there. Bearing these principles in mind helps us to make sense of the Israeli government's actions during this period.

To begin, Barak discarded a number of interim steps, even those to which Israel was formally committed by various agreements—including a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank, the transfer to Palestinian control of three villages abutting Jerusalem, and the release of Palestinians imprisoned for acts committed before the Oslo agreement. He did not want to estrange the right prematurely or be (or appear to be) a "sucker" by handing over assets, only to be rebuffed on the permanent status deal. In Barak's binary cost-benefit analysis, such steps did not add up: on the one hand, if Israelis and Palestinians reached a final agreement, all these minor steps (and then some) would be taken; on the other hand, if the parties failed to reach a final agreement, those steps would have been wasted. What is more, concessions to the Palestinians would cost Barak precious political capital he was determined to husband until the final, climactic moment.

The better route, he thought, was to present all concessions and all rewards in one comprehensive package that the Israeli public would be asked to accept in a national referendum. Oslo was being turned on its head. It had been a wager on success—a blank check signed by two sides willing to take difficult preliminary steps in the expectation that they would reach an agreement. Barak's approach was a hedge against failure—a reluctance to make preliminary concessions out of fear that they might not.

Much the same can be said about Israel's expansion of the West Bank settlements, which proceeded at a rapid pace. Barak saw no reason to needlessly alienate the settler constituency. Moreover, insofar as new housing units were being established on land that Israel ultimately would annex under a permanent deal—at least any permanent deal Barak would sign—he saw no harm to the Palestinians in permitting such construction. In other words, Barak's single-minded focus on the big picture only magnified in his eyes the significance—and cost—of the small steps. Precisely because he was willing to move a great distance in a final agreement (on territory or on Jerusalem, for example), he was unwilling to move an inch in the preamble (prisoners, settlements, troop redeployment, Jerusalem villages).

Barak's principles also shed light on his all-or-nothing approach. In Barak's mind, Arafat had to be made to understand that there was no "third way," no "reversion to the interim approach," but rather a corridor leading either to an agreement or to confrontation. Seeking to enlist the support of the US and European nations for this plan, he asked them to threaten Arafat with the consequences of his obstinacy: the blame would be laid on the Palestinians and relations with them would be downgraded. Likewise, and throughout Camp David, Barak repeatedly urged the US to avoid mention of any fall-back options or of the possibility of continued negotiations in the event the summit failed.

The Prime Minister's insistence on holding a summit and the timing of the Camp David talks followed naturally. Barak was prepared to have his negotiators engage in preliminary discussions, which in fact took place for several months prior to Camp David. But for him, these were not the channels in which real progress could be made. Only by insisting on a single, high-level summit could all the necessary ingredients of success be present: the drama of a stark, all-or-nothing proposal; the prospect that Arafat might lose US support; the exposure of the ineffectiveness of Palestinian salami-tactics (pocketing Israeli concessions that become the starting point at the next round); and, ultimately, the capacity to unveil to the Israeli people all the achievements and concessions of the deal in one fell swoop.

2.

In Gaza and the West Bank, Barak's election was greeted with mixed emotions. Benjamin Netanyahu, his immediate predecessor, had failed to implement several of Israel's signed obligations and, for that reason alone, his defeat was welcome. But during his campaign, Barak had given no indication that he was prepared for major compromises with the Palestinians. Labor back in power also meant Tel Aviv back in Washington's good graces; Netanyahu's tenure, by contrast, had seen a gradual

cooling of America's relations with Israel and a concomitant warming of its relations with the Palestinian Authority.

Palestinians were looking for early reassuring signs from Barak; his first moves were anything but. His broad government coalition (an assortment of peace advocates and hard-liners), his tough positions on issues like Jerusalem, and his reluctance to confront the settlers all contributed to an early atmosphere of distrust. Delays in addressing core Palestinian concerns—such as implementing the 1998 Wye Agreement (which Barak chose to renegotiate) or beginning permanent status talks (which Barak postponed by waiting to name a lead negotiator)—were particularly irksome given the impatient mood that prevailed in the territories. Seen from Gaza and the West Bank, Oslo's legacy read like a litany of promises deferred or unfulfilled. Six years after the agreement, there were more Israeli settlements, less freedom of movement, and worse economic conditions. Powerful Palestinian constituencies—the intellectuals, security establishment, media, business community, "state" bureaucrats, political activists—whose support was vital for any peace effort were disillusioned with the results of the peace process, doubtful of Israel's willingness to implement signed agreements, and, now, disenchanted with Barak's rhetoric and actions.

Perhaps most disturbing was Barak's early decision to concentrate on reaching a deal with Syria rather than with the Palestinians, a decision that Arafat experienced as a triple blow. The Palestinians saw it as an instrument of pressure, designed to isolate them; as a delaying tactic that would waste precious months; and as a public humiliation, intended to put them in their place. Over the years, Syria had done nothing to address Israeli concerns. There was no recognition, no bilateral contacts, not even a suspension of assistance to groups intent on fighting Israel. During that time, the PLO had recognized Israel, countless face-to-face negotiations had taken place, and Israeli and Palestinian security services had worked hand in hand. In spite of all this, Hafez al-Assad—not Arafat—was the first leader to be courted by the new Israeli government.

In March 2000, after the failed Geneva summit between Clinton and President Assad made clear that the Syrian track had run its course, Barak chose to proceed full steam ahead with the Palestinians, setting a deadline of only a few months to reach a permanent agreement. But by then, the frame of mind on the other side was anything but receptive. It was Barak's timetable, imposed after his Syrian gambit had failed, and designed with his own strategy in mind. Arafat was not about to oblige.

Indeed, behind almost all of Barak's moves, Arafat believed he could discern the objective of either forcing him to swallow an unconscionable deal or mobilizing the world to isolate and weaken the Palestinians if they refused to yield. Barak's stated view that the alternative to an agreement would be a situation far grimmer than the status quo created an atmosphere of pressure that only confirmed Arafat's suspicions—and the greater the pressure, the more stubborn the belief among Palestinians that Barak was trying to dupe them.

Moreover, the steps Barak undertook to husband his resources while negotiating a historical final deal were interpreted by the Palestinians as efforts to weaken them while imposing an unfair one. Particularly troubling from this perspective was Barak's attitude toward the interim commitments, based on the Oslo, Wye, and later agreements. Those who claim that Arafat lacked interest in a permanent deal miss the point. Like Barak, the Palestinian leader felt that permanent status negotiations were long overdue; unlike Barak, he did not think that this justified doing away with the interim obligations.

For Arafat, interim and permanent issues are inextricably linked—"part and parcel of each other," he told the President—precisely because they must be kept scrupulously separate. Unfulfilled interim obligations did more than cast doubt on Israel's intent to deliver; in Arafat's eyes, they directly affected the balance of power that was to prevail once permanent status negotiations commenced.

To take the simplest example: if Israel still held on to land that was supposed to be turned over during the interim phase, then the Palestinians would have to negotiate over *that* land as well during permanent status negotiations. And while Barak claimed that unfulfilled interim obligations would be quickly forgotten in the event that the summit succeeded, Arafat feared that they might just as quickly

be ignored in the event that it failed. In other words, Barak's seemed a take-it-or-leave-it proposition in which leaving it meant forsaking not only the permanent status proposal, but also a further withdrawal of Israeli forces, the Jerusalem villages, the prisoner releases, and other interim commitments. Worse, it meant being confronted with the new settlement units in areas that Barak self-confidently assumed would be annexed to Israel under a permanent status deal.

In many ways, Barak's actions led to a classic case of misaddressed messages: the intended recipients of his tough statements—the domestic constituency he was seeking to carry with him—barely listened, while their unintended recipients—the Palestinians he would sway with his final offer—listened only too well. Never convinced that Barak was ready to go far at all, the Palestinians were not about to believe that he was holding on to his assets in order to go far enough. For them, his goals were to pressure the Palestinians, lower their expectations, and worsen their alternatives. In short, everything Barak saw as evidence that he was serious, the Palestinians considered to be evidence that he was not.

For these reasons, Camp David seemed to Arafat to encapsulate his worst nightmares. It was high-wire summitry, designed to increase the pressure on the Palestinians to reach a quick agreement while heightening the political and symbolic costs if they did not. And it clearly was a Clinton/ Barak idea both in concept and timing, and for that reason alone highly suspect. That the US issued the invitations despite Israel's refusal to carry out its earlier commitments and despite Arafat's plea for additional time to prepare only reinforced in his mind the sense of a US-Israeli conspiracy.

On June 15, during his final meeting with Clinton before Camp David, Arafat set forth his case: Barak had not implemented prior agreements, there had been no progress in the negotiations, and the prime minister was holding all the cards. The only conceivable outcome of going to a summit, he told Secretary Albright, was to have everything explode in the President's face. If there is no summit, at least there will still be hope. The summit is our last card, Arafat said—do you really want to burn it? In the end, Arafat went to Camp David, for not to do so would have been to incur America's anger; but he went intent more on surviving than on benefiting from it.

3.

Given both the mistrust and tactical clumsiness that characterized the two sides, the United States faced a formidable challenge. At the time, though, administration officials believed there was a historic opportunity for an agreement. Barak was eager for a deal, wanted it achieved during Clinton's term in office, and had surrounded himself with some of Israel's most peace-minded politicians. For his part, Arafat had the opportunity to preside over the first Palestinian state, and he enjoyed a special bond with Clinton, the first US president to have met and dealt with him. As for Clinton, he was prepared to devote as much of his presidency as it took to make the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations succeed. A decision *not* to seize the opportunity would have produced as many regrets as the decision to seize it produced recriminations.

Neither the President nor his advisers were blind to the growing distrust between the two sides or to Barak's tactical missteps. They had been troubled by his decision to favor negotiations with the "other woman," the Syrian president, who distracted him from his legitimate, albeit less appealing, Palestinian bride-to-be. Barak's inability to create a working relationship with Arafat was bemoaned in the administration; his entreaties to the Americans to "expose" and "unmask" Arafat to the world were largely ignored.

When Barak reneged on his commitment to transfer the three Jerusalem villages to the Palestinians—a commitment the Prime Minister had specifically authorized Clinton to convey, in the President's name, to Arafat—Clinton was furious. As he put it, this was the first time that he had been made out to be a "false prophet" to a foreign leader. And, in an extraordinary moment at Camp David, when Barak retracted some of his positions, the President confronted him, expressing all his accumulated frustrations. "I can't go see Arafat with a retrenchment! You can sell it; there is no way I can. This is not real. This is not serious. I went to Shepherdstown [for the Israeli-Syrian negotiations] and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva [for the summit with Assad] and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding. I will not let it happen here!"

In the end, though, and on almost all these questionable tactical judgments, the US either gave up or gave in, reluctantly acquiescing in the way Barak did things out of respect for the things he was trying to do. For there was a higher good, which was Barak's determination to reach peace agreements with Syria and the Palestinians. As early as July 1999, during their first meeting, Barak had outlined to Clinton his vision of a comprehensive peace. He provided details regarding his strategy, a timetable, even the (astronomical) US funding that would be required for Israel's security, Palestinian and Syrian economic assistance, and refugee resettlement. These were not the words of a man with a ploy but of a man with a mission.

The relationship between Clinton and Barak escapes easy classification. The President, a political pro, was full of empathy, warmth, and personal charm; the Prime Minister, a self-proclaimed political novice, was mainly at ease with cool, logical argument. Where the President's tactics were fluid, infinitely adaptable to the reactions of others, Barak's every move seemed to have been conceived and then frozen in his own mind. At Camp David, Clinton offered Barak some advice: "You are smarter and more experienced than I am in war. But I am older in politics. And I have learned from my mistakes."

Yet in their political relations, the two men were genuine intimates. For all his complicated personality traits, Barak was deemed a privileged partner because of his determination to reach a final deal and the risks he was prepared to take to get there. When these were stacked against Arafat's perceived inflexibility and emphasis on interim commitments, the administration found it hard not to accommodate Barak's requests. As the President told Arafat three weeks before Camp David began, he largely agreed with the chairman's depiction of Barak—politically maladroit, frustrating, lacking in personal touch. But he differed with Arafat on a crucial point: he was convinced that Barak genuinely wanted a historic deal.

The President's decision to hold the Camp David summit despite Arafat's protestations illuminates much about US policy during this period. In June, Barak—who for some time had been urging that a summit be rapidly convened—told the President and Secretary Albright that Palestinian negotiators had not moved an inch and that his negotiators had reached the end of their compromises; anything more would have to await a summit. He also warned that without a summit, his government (at least in its current form) would be gone within a few weeks.

At the same time, Arafat posed several conditions for agreeing to go to a summit. First, he sought additional preparatory talks to ensure that Camp David would not fail. Second, he requested that the third Israeli territorial withdrawal be implemented before Camp David—a demand that, when rebuffed by the US, turned into a request that the US "guarantee" the withdrawal even if Camp David did not yield an agreement (what he called a "safety net"). A third Palestinian request—volunteered by Clinton, rather than being demanded by Arafat—was that the US remain neutral in the event the summit failed and not blame the Palestinians.

The administration by and large shared Arafat's views. The Palestinians' most legitimate concern, in American eyes, was that without additional preparatory work the risk of failure was too great. In June, speaking of a possible summit, Clinton told Barak, "I want to do this, but not under circumstances that will kill Oslo." Clinton also agreed with Arafat on the need for action on the interim issues. He extracted a commitment from Barak that the third Israeli withdrawal would take place with or without a final deal, and, in June, he privately told the Chairman he would support a "substantial" withdrawal were Camp David to fail. Describing all the reasons for Arafat's misgivings, he urged Barak to put himself "in Arafat's shoes" and to open the summit with a series of goodwill gestures toward the Palestinians. Finally, Clinton assured Arafat on the eve of the summit that he would not be blamed if the summit did not succeed. "There will be," he pledged, "no finger-pointing."

Yet, having concurred with the Palestinians' contentions on the merits, the US immediately proceeded to disregard them. Ultimately, there was neither additional preparation before the summit, nor a third redeployment of Israeli troops, nor any action on interim issues. And Arafat got blamed in no uncertain terms.

Why this discrepancy between promise and performance? Most importantly, because Barak's reasoning—and his timetable—had an irresistible logic to them. If nothing was going to happen at pre-summit negotiations—and nothing was—if his government was on the brink of collapse, and if he would put on Camp David's table concessions he had not made before, how could the President say no? What would be gained by waiting? Certainly not the prospect offered by Arafat—another interminable negotiation over a modest territorial withdrawal. And most probably, as many analysts predicted, an imminent confrontation, if Arafat proceeded with his plan to unilaterally announce a state on September 13, 2000, or if the frustration among the Palestinians—of which the world had had a glimpse during the May 2000 upheaval—were to reach boiling point once again.

As for the interim issues, US officials believed that whatever Palestinian anger resulted from Israeli lapses would evaporate in the face of an appealing final deal. As a corollary, from the President on down, US officials chose to use their leverage with the Israelis to obtain movement on the issues that had to be dealt with in a permanent agreement rather than expend it on interim ones.

The President's decision to ignore his commitment to Arafat and blame the Palestinians after the summit points to another factor, which is how the two sides were perceived during the negotiations. As seen from Washington, Camp David exemplified Barak's political courage and Arafat's political passivity, risk-taking on the one hand, risk-aversion on the other. The first thing on the President's mind after Camp David was thus to help the Prime Minister, whose concessions had jeopardized his political standing at home. Hence the finger-pointing. And the last thing on Clinton's mind was to insist on a further Israeli withdrawal. Hence the absence of a safety net. This brings us to the heart of the matter—the substance of the negotiations themselves, and the reality behind the prevailing perception that a generous Israeli offer met an unyielding Palestinian response.

4.

Was there a generous Israeli offer and, if so, was it peremptorily rejected by Arafat?

If there is one issue that Israelis agree on, it is that Barak broke every conceivable taboo and went as far as any Israeli prime minister had gone or could go. Coming into office on a pledge to retain Jerusalem as Israel's "eternal and undivided capital," he ended up appearing to agree to Palestinian sovereignty—first over some, then over all, of the Arab sectors of East Jerusalem. Originally adamant in rejecting the argument that Israel should swap some of the occupied West Bank territory for land within its 1967 borders, he finally came around to that view. After initially speaking of a Palestinian state covering roughly 80 percent of the West Bank, he gradually moved up to the low 90s before acquiescing to the mid-90s range.

Even so, it is hard to state with confidence how far Barak was actually prepared to go. His strategy was predicated on the belief that Israel ought not to reveal its final positions—not even to the United States—unless and until the endgame was in sight. Had any member of the US peace team been asked to describe Barak's true positions before or even during Camp David—indeed, were any asked that question today—they would be hard-pressed to answer. Barak's worst fear was that he would put forward Israeli concessions and pay the price domestically, only to see the Palestinians using the concessions as a new point of departure. And his trust in the Americans went only so far, fearing that they might reveal to the Palestinians what he was determined to conceal.

As a consequence, each Israeli position was presented as unmovable, a red line that approached "the bone" of Israeli interests; this served as a means of both forcing the Palestinians to make concessions and preserving Israel's bargaining positions in the event they did not. On the eve of Camp David, Israeli negotiators described their purported red lines to their American counterparts: the annexation of more than 10 percent of the West Bank, sovereignty over parts of the strip along the Jordan River, and rejection of any territorial swaps. At the opening of Camp David, Barak warned the Americans that he could not accept Palestinian sovereignty over any part of East Jerusalem other than a purely symbolic "foothold." Earlier, he had claimed that if Arafat asked for 95 percent of the West Bank, there would be no deal. Yet, at the same time, he gave clear hints that Israel was willing to show more flexibility if Arafat was prepared to "contemplate" the endgame. Bottom lines and false bottoms: the tension, and the ambiguity, were always there.

Gradual shifts in Barak's positions also can be explained by the fact that each proposal seemed to be based less on a firm estimate of what Israel had to hold on to and more on a changing appraisal of what it could obtain. Barak apparently took the view that, faced with a sufficiently attractive proposal and an appropriately unattractive alternative, the Palestinians would have no choice but to say yes. In effect, each successive Palestinian "no" led to the next best Israeli assessment of what, in their right minds, the Palestinians couldn't turn down.

The final and largely unnoticed consequence of Barak's approach is that, strictly speaking, there never was an Israeli offer. Determined to preserve Israel's position in the event of failure, and resolved not to let the Palestinians take advantage of one-sided compromises, the Israelis always stopped one, if not several, steps short of a proposal. The ideas put forward at Camp David were never stated in writing, but orally conveyed. They generally were presented as US concepts, not Israeli ones; indeed, despite having demanded the opportunity to negotiate face to face with Arafat, Barak refused to hold any substantive meeting with him at Camp David out of fear that the Palestinian leader would seek to put Israeli concessions on the record. Nor were the proposals detailed. If written down, the American ideas at Camp David would have covered no more than a few pages. Barak and the Americans insisted that Arafat accept them as general "bases for negotiations" before launching into more rigorous negotiations.

According to those "bases," Palestine would have sovereignty over 91 percent of the West Bank; Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank and, in exchange, Palestine would have sovereignty over parts of pre-1967 Israel equivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank, but with no indication of where either would be. On the highly sensitive issue of refugees, the proposal spoke only of a "satisfactory solution." Even on Jerusalem, where the most detail was provided, many blanks remained to be filled in. Arafat was told that Palestine would have sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, but only a loosely defined "permanent custodianship" over the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam. The status of the rest of the city would fluctuate between Palestinian sovereignty and functional autonomy. Finally, Barak was careful not to accept anything. His statements about positions he could support were conditional, couched as a willingness to negotiate on the basis of the US proposals so long as Arafat did the same.

5.

Much as they tried, the Palestinian leaders have proved utterly unable to make their case. In Israel and the US, they are consistently depicted as uncompromising and incapable of responding to Barak's supreme effort. Yet, in their own eyes, they were the ones who made the principal concessions.

For all the talk about peace and reconciliation, most Palestinians were more resigned to the two-state solution than they were willing to embrace it; they were prepared to accept Israel's existence, but not its moral legitimacy. The war for the whole of Palestine was over because it had been lost. Oslo, as they saw it, was not about negotiating peace terms but terms of surrender. Bearing this perspective in mind explains the Palestinians' view that Oslo itself is the historic compromise—an agreement to concede 78 percent of mandatory Palestine to Israel. And it explains why they were so sensitive to the Israelis' use of language. The notion that Israel was "offering" land, being "generous," or "making concessions" seemed to them doubly wrong—in a single stroke both affirming Israel's right and denying the Palestinians'. For the Palestinians, land was not given but given back.

Even during the period following the Oslo agreement, the Palestinians considered that they were the ones who had come up with creative ideas to address Israeli concerns. While denouncing Israeli settlements as illegal, they accepted the principle that Israel would annex some of the West Bank settlements in exchange for an equivalent amount of Israeli land being transferred to the Palestinians. While insisting on the Palestinian refugees' right to return to homes lost in 1948, they were prepared to tie this right to a mechanism of implementation providing alternative choices for the refugees while limiting the numbers returning to Israel proper. Despite their insistence on Israel's withdrawal from all lands occupied in 1967, they were open to a division of East Jerusalem granting Israel sovereignty over its Jewish areas (the Jewish Quarter, the Wailing Wall, and the Jewish neighborhoods) in clear contravention of this principle.

These compromises notwithstanding, the Palestinians never managed to rid themselves of their intransigent image. Indeed, the Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own. In failing to do either, the Palestinians denied the US the leverage it felt it needed to test Barak's stated willingness to go the extra mile and thereby provoked the President's anger. When Abu Ala'a, a leading Palestinian negotiator, refused to work on a map to negotiate a possible solution, arguing that Israel first had to concede that any territorial agreement must be based on the line of June 4, 1967, the President burst out, "Don't simply say to the Israelis that their map is no good. Give me something better!" When Abu Ala'a again balked, the President stormed out: "This is a fraud. It is not a summit. I won't have the United States covering for negotiations in bad faith. Let's quit!" Toward the end of the summit, an irate Clinton would tell Arafat: "If the Israelis can make compromises and you can't, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. These things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace process.... Let's let hell break loose and live with the consequences."

How is one to explain the Palestinians' behavior? As has been mentioned earlier, Arafat was persuaded that the Israelis were setting a trap. His primary objective thus became to cut his losses rather than maximize his gains. That did not mean that he ruled out reaching a final deal, but that goal seemed far less attainable than others. Beyond that, much has to do with the political climate that prevailed within Palestinian society. Unlike the situation during and after Oslo, there was no coalition of powerful Palestinian constituencies committed to the success of Camp David. Groups whose support was necessary to sell any agreement had become disbelievers, convinced that Israel would neither sign a fair agreement nor implement what it signed. Palestinian negotiators, with one eye on the summit and another back home, went to Camp David almost apologetically, determined to demonstrate that this time they would not be duped. More prone to caution than to creativity, they viewed any US or Israeli idea with suspicion. They could not accept the ambiguous formulations that had served to bridge differences between the parties in the past and that later, in their view, had been interpreted to Israel's advantage; this time around, only clear and unequivocal understandings would do.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of what is known as the Haram al-Sharif to Palestinians and the Temple Mount to Jews. The Americans spent countless hours seeking imaginative formulations to finesse the issue of which party would enjoy sovereignty over this sacred place—a coalition of nations, the United Nations Security Council, even God himself was proposed. In the end, the Palestinians would have nothing of it: the agreement had to give them sovereignty, or there would be no agreement at all.

Domestic hostility toward the summit also exacerbated tensions among the dozen or so Palestinian negotiators, which, never far from the surface, had grown as the stakes rose, with the possibility of a final deal and the coming struggle for succession. The negotiators looked over their shoulders, fearful of adopting positions that would undermine them back home. Appearing to act disparately and without a central purpose, each Palestinian negotiator gave preeminence to a particular issue, making virtually impossible the kinds of trade-offs that, inevitably, a compromise would entail. Ultimately, most chose to go through the motions rather than go for a deal. Ironically, Barak the democrat had far more individual leeway than Arafat the supposed autocrat. Lacking internal cohesion, Palestinian negotiators were unable to treat Camp David as a decisive, let alone a historic, gathering.

The Palestinians saw acceptance of the US ideas, even as "bases for further negotiations," as presenting dangers of its own. The Camp David proposals were viewed as inadequate: they were silent on the question of refugees, the land exchange was unbalanced, and both the Haram and much of Arab East Jerusalem were to remain under Israeli sovereignty. To accept these proposals in the hope that Barak would then move further risked diluting the Palestinian position in a fundamental way: by shifting the terms of debate from the international legitimacy of United Nations resolutions on Israeli withdrawal and on refugee return to the imprecise ideas suggested by the US. Without the guarantee of a deal, this was tantamount to gambling with what the Palestinians considered their most valuable currency, international legality. The Palestinians' reluctance to do anything that might undercut the role of UN resolutions that applied to them was reinforced by Israel's decision to scrupulously implement those that applied to Lebanon and unilaterally withdraw from that country in

the months preceding Camp David. Full withdrawal, which had been obtained by Egypt and basically offered to Syria, was now being granted to Lebanon. If Hezbollah, an armed militia that still considered itself at war with Israel, had achieved such an outcome, surely a national movement that had been negotiating peacefully with Israel for years should expect no less.

The Palestinians' overall behavior, when coupled with Barak's conviction that Arafat merely wanted to extract Israeli concessions, led to disastrous results. The mutual and by then deeply entrenched suspicion meant that Barak would conceal his final proposals, the "endgame," until Arafat had moved, and that Arafat would not move until he could see the endgame. Barak's strategy was predicated on the idea that his firmness would lead to some Palestinian flexibility, which in turn would justify Israel's making further concessions. Instead, Barak's piecemeal negotiation style, combined with Arafat's unwillingness to budge, produced a paradoxical result. By presenting early positions as bottom lines, the Israelis provoked the Palestinians' mistrust; by subsequently shifting them, they whetted the Palestinians' appetite. By the end of the process, it was hard to tell which bottom lines were for real, and which were not.

6.

The United States had several different roles in the negotiations, complex and often contradictory: as principal broker of the putative peace deal; as guardian of the peace process; as Israel's strategic ally; and as its cultural and political partner. The ideas it put forward throughout the process bore the imprint of each.

As the broker of the agreement, the President was expected to present a final deal that Arafat could not refuse. Indeed, that notion was the premise of Barak's attraction to a summit. But the United States' ability to play the part was hamstrung by two of its other roles. First, America's political and cultural affinity with Israel translated into an acute sensitivity to Israeli domestic concerns and an exaggerated appreciation of Israel's substantive moves. American officials initially were taken aback when Barak indicated he could accept a division of the Old City or Palestinian sovereignty over many of Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods—a reaction that reflected less an assessment of what a "fair solution" ought to be than a sense of what the Israeli public could stomach. The US team often pondered whether Barak could sell a given proposal to his people, including some he himself had made. The question rarely, if ever, was asked about Arafat.

A second constraint on the US derived from its strategic relationship with Israel. One consequence of this was the "no-surprise rule," an American commitment, if not to clear, at least to share in advance, each of its ideas with Israel. Because Barak's strategy precluded early exposure of his bottom lines to anyone (the President included), he would invoke the "no-surprise rule" to argue against US substantive proposals he felt went too far. The US ended up (often unwittingly) presenting Israeli negotiating positions and couching them as rock-bottom red lines beyond which Israel could not go. Faced with Arafat's rejection, Clinton would obtain Barak's acquiescence in a somewhat improved proposal, and present it to the Palestinians as, once again, the best any Israeli could be expected to do. With the US playing an endgame strategy ("this is it!") in what was in fact the middle of the game ("well, perhaps not"), the result was to depreciate the assets Barak most counted on for the *real* finale: the Palestinians' confidence in Clinton, US credibility, and America's ability to exercise effective pressure. Nor was the US tendency to justify its ideas by referring to Israeli domestic concerns the most effective way to persuade the Palestinians to make concessions. In short, the "no-surprise rule" held a few surprises of its own. In a curious, boomerang-like effect, it helped convince the Palestinians that any US idea, no matter how forthcoming, was an Israeli one, and therefore both immediately suspect and eminently negotiable.

Seven years of fostering the peace process, often against difficult odds, further eroded the United States' effectiveness at this critical stage. The deeper Washington's investment in the process, the greater the stake in its success, and the quicker the tendency to indulge either side's whims and destructive behavior for the sake of salvaging it. US threats and deadlines too often were ignored as Israelis and Palestinians appeared confident that the Americans were too busy running after the parties to think seriously of walking away.

Yet for all that, the United States had an important role in shaping the content of the proposals. One of the more debilitating effects of the visible alignment between Israel and the United States was that it obscured the real differences between them. Time and again, and usually without the Palestinians being aware of it, the President sought to convince the Prime Minister to accept what until then he had refused—among them the principle of land swaps, Palestinian sovereignty over at least part of Arab East Jerusalem and, after Camp David, over the Haram al-Sharif, as well as a significantly reduced area of Israeli annexation. This led Barak to comment to the President that, on matters of substance, the US was much closer to the Palestinians' position than to Israel's. This was only one reflection of a far wider pattern of divergence between Israeli and American positions—yet one that has systematically been ignored by Palestinians and other Arabs alike.

This inability to grasp the complex relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv cost Arafat dearly. By failing to put forward clear proposals, the Palestinians deprived the Americans of the instrument they felt they needed to further press the Israelis, and it led them to question both the seriousness of the Palestinians and their genuine desire for a deal. As the President repeatedly told Arafat during Camp David, he was not expecting him to agree to US or Israeli proposals, but he was counting on him to say something he could take back to Barak to get him to move some more. "I need something to tell him," he implored. "So far, I have nothing."

Ultimately, the path of negotiation imagined by the Americans—get a position that was close to Israel's genuine bottom line; present it to the Palestinians; get a counterproposal from them; bring it back to the Israelis—took more than one wrong turn. It started without a real bottom line, continued without a counterproposal, and ended without a deal.

7.

Beneath the superficial snapshot—Barak's offer, Arafat's rejection—lies a picture that is both complex and confusing. Designed to preserve his assets for the "moment of truth," Barak's tactics helped to ensure that the parties never got there. His decision to view everything through the prism of an all-or-nothing negotiation over a comprehensive deal led him to see every step as a test of wills, any confidence-building measure as a weakness-displaying one. Obsessed with Barak's tactics, Arafat spent far less time worrying about the substance of a deal than he did fretting about a possible ploy. Fixated on potential traps, he could not see potential opportunities. He never quite realized how far the prime minister was prepared to go, how much the US was prepared to push, how strong a hand he had been dealt. Having spent a decade building a relationship with Washington, he proved incapable of using it when he needed it most. As for the United States, it never fully took control of the situation. Pulled in various and inconsistent directions, it never quite figured out which way to go, too often allowing itself to be used rather than using its authority.

Many of those inclined to blame Arafat alone for the collapse of the negotiations point to his inability to accept the ideas for a settlement put forward by Clinton on December 23, five months after the Camp David talks ended. During these months additional talks had taken place between Israelis and Palestinians, and furious violence had broken out between the two sides. The President's proposal showed that the distance traveled since Camp David was indeed considerable, and almost all in the Palestinians' direction. Under the settlement outlined by the President, Palestine would have sovereignty over 94 to 96 percent of the West Bank and it would as well have land belonging to pre-1967 Israel equivalent to another 1 to 3 percent of West Bank territory. Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to their homeland in historic Palestine, a right that would guarantee their unrestricted ability to live in Palestine while subjecting their absorption into Israel to Israel's sovereign decision. In Jerusalem, all that is Arab would be Palestinian, all that is Jewish would be Israeli. Palestine would exercise sovereignty over the Haram and Israel over the Western Wall, through which it would preserve a connection to the location of the ancient Jewish Temple.

Unlike at Camp David, and as shown both by the time it took him to react and by the ambiguity of his reactions, Arafat thought hard before providing his response. But in the end, many of the features that troubled him in July came back to haunt him in December. As at Camp David, Clinton was not presenting the terms of a final deal, but rather "parameters" within which accelerated, final negotiations were to take place. As at Camp David, Arafat felt under pressure, with both Clinton and

Barak announcing that the ideas would be off the table—would “depart with the President”—unless they were accepted by both sides. With only thirty days left in Clinton’s presidency and hardly more in Barak’s premiership, the likelihood of reaching a deal was remote at best; if no deal could be made, the Palestinians feared they would be left with principles that were detailed enough to supersede international resolutions yet too fuzzy to constitute an agreement.

Besides, and given the history of the negotiations, they were unable to escape the conclusion that these were warmed-over Israeli positions and that a better proposal may still have been forthcoming. In this instance, in fact, the United States had resisted last-minute Israeli attempts to water down the proposals on two key items—Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and the extent of the territory of the Palestinian state. All told, Arafat preferred to continue negotiating under the comforting umbrella of international resolutions rather than within the confines of America’s uncertain proposals. In January, a final effort between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in the Egyptian town of Taba (without the Americans) produced more progress and some hope. But it was, by then, at least to some of the negotiators, too late. On January 20, Clinton had packed his bags and was on his way out. In Israel, meanwhile, Sharon was on his way in.

Had there been, in hindsight, a generous Israeli offer? Ask a member of the American team, and an honest answer might be that there was a moving target of ideas, fluctuating impressions of the deal the US could sell to the two sides, a work in progress that reacted (and therefore was vulnerable) to the pressures and persuasion of both. Ask Barak, and he might volunteer that there was no Israeli offer and, besides, Arafat rejected it. Ask Arafat, and the response you might hear is that there was no offer, besides, it was unacceptable; that said, it had better remain on the table.

Offer or no offer, the negotiations that took place between July 2000 and February 2001 make up an indelible chapter in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This may be hard to discern today, amid the continuing violence and accumulated mistrust. But taboos were shattered, the unspoken got spoken, and, during that period, Israelis and Palestinians reached an unprecedented level of understanding of what it will take to end their struggle. When the two sides resume their path toward a permanent agreement—and eventually, they will—they will come to it with the memory of those remarkable eight months, the experience of how far they had come and how far they had yet to go, and with the sobering wisdom of an opportunity that was missed by all, less by design than by mistake, more through miscalculation than through mischief.

—July 12, 2001

Letters

June 13, 2002: Benny Morris, *Camp David and After: An Exchange of Views*. An Interview with Philip
Roth

September 20, 2001: Dennis Ross, *Camp David: An Exchange of Views*

The Geneva Accord

The following is the complete text of the Geneva Accord obtained from the official web site of the [Geneva Accord Public Initiative](#).

Draft Permanent Status Agreement

Preamble

The State of Israel (hereinafter "Israel") and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people (hereinafter the "Parties"):

- Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation;
- Recognizing that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words characteristic of the state of war are neither appropriate nor acceptable in the era of peace;
- Affirming their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the only viable solution is a two-state solution based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338;
- Affirming that this agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties' respective citizens;
- Recognizing that after years of living in mutual fear and insecurity, both peoples need to enter an era of peace, security and stability, entailing all necessary actions by the parties to guarantee the realization of this era;
- Recognizing each other's right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
- Determined to establish relations based on cooperation and the commitment to live side by side as good neighbors aiming both separately and jointly to contribute to the well-being of their peoples;
- Reaffirming their obligation to conduct themselves in conformity with the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations;

- Confirming that this Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, the subsequent agreements including the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and the permanent status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the Clinton Ideas of December 2000, and the Taba Negotiations of January 2001;
- Reiterating their commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and confirming their understanding that this Agreement is based on, will lead to, and –by its fulfillment-- will constitute the full implementation of these resolutions and to the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in all its aspects;
- Declaring that this Agreement constitutes the realization of the permanent status peace component envisaged in President Bush's speech of June 24, 2002 and in the Quartet Roadmap process.
- Declaring that this Agreement marks the historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis, and paves the way to reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel in accordance with the relevant clauses of the Beirut Arab League Resolution of March 28, 2002; and
- Resolved to pursue the goal of attaining a comprehensive regional peace, thus contributing to stability, security, development and prosperity throughout the region;

Have agreed on the following

Article 1 – Purpose of the Permanent Status Agreement

1. The Permanent Status Agreement (hereinafter "this Agreement") ends the era of conflict and ushers in a new era based on peace, cooperation, and good neighborly relations between the Parties.
2. The implementation of this Agreement will settle all the claims of the Parties arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.

Article 2 – Relations between the Parties

1. The state of Israel shall recognize the state of Palestine (hereinafter “Palestine”) upon its establishment. The state of Palestine shall immediately recognize the state of Israel.
2. The state of Palestine shall be the successor to the PLO with all its rights and obligations.
3. Israel and Palestine shall immediately establish full diplomatic and consular relations with each other and will exchange resident Ambassadors, within one month of their mutual recognition.
4. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The Parties are committed not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
5. This Agreement supercedes all prior agreements between the Parties.
6. Without prejudice to the commitments undertaken by them in this Agreement, relations between Israel and Palestine shall be based upon the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. With a view to the advancement of the relations between the two States and peoples, Palestine and Israel shall cooperate in areas of common interest. These shall include, but are not limited to, dialogue between their legislatures and state institutions, cooperation between their appropriate local authorities, promotion of non-governmental civil society cooperation, and joint programs and exchange in the areas of culture, media, youth, science, education, environment, health, agriculture, tourism, and crime prevention. The Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee will oversee this cooperation in accordance with Article 8.
8. The Parties shall cooperate in areas of joint economic interest, to best realize the human potential of their respective peoples. In this regard, they will work bilaterally, regionally, and with the international community to maximize the benefit of peace to the broadest cross-section of their respective populations. Relevant standing bodies shall be established by the Parties to this effect.
9. The Parties shall establish robust modalities for security cooperation, and engage in a comprehensive and uninterrupted effort to end terrorism and violence directed against each others persons, property, institutions or territory. This effort shall continue at all times, and shall be insulated from any possible crises and other aspects of the Parties' relations.
10. Israel and Palestine shall work together and separately with other parties in the region to enhance and promote regional cooperation and coordination in spheres of common interest.
11. The Parties shall establish a ministerial-level Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee to guide, monitor, and facilitate the process of implementation of this

Agreement, both bilaterally and in accordance with the mechanisms in Article 3 hereunder.

Article 3: Implementation and Verification Group

1. Establishment and Composition

- i. An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall hereby be established to facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of this Agreement.
- ii. The IVG shall include the US, the Russian Federation, the EU, the UN, and other parties, both regional and international, to be agreed on by the Parties.
- iii. The IVG shall work in coordination with the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee established in Article 2/11 above and subsequent to that with the Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC) established in Article 8 hereunder.
- iv. The structure, procedures, and modalities of the IVG are set forth below and detailed in Annex X.

2. Structure

- i. A senior political-level contact group (Contact Group), composed of all the IVG members, shall be the highest authority in the IVG.
- ii. The Contact Group shall appoint, in consultation with the Parties, a Special Representative who will be the principal executive of the IVG on the ground. The Special Representative shall manage the work of the IVG and maintain constant contact with the Parties, the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee, and the Contact Group.
- iii. The IVG permanent headquarters and secretariat shall be based in an agreed upon location in Jerusalem.
- iv. The IVG shall establish its bodies referred to in this Agreement and additional bodies as it deems necessary. These bodies shall be an integral part of and under the authority of the IVG.
- v. The Multinational Force (MF) established under Article 5 shall be an integral part of the IVG. The Special Representative shall, subject to the approval of the Parties, appoint the Commander of the MF who shall be responsible for the daily command of the MF. Details relating to the Special Representative and MF Force Commander are set forth in Annex X.
- vi. The IVG shall establish a dispute settlement mechanism, in accordance with Article 16.

3. Coordination with the Parties

A Trilateral Committee composed of the Special Representative and the Palestinian-Israeli High Steering Committee shall be established and shall meet on at least a monthly basis to review the implementation of this Agreement. The Trilateral

Committee will convene within 48 hours upon the request of any of the three parties represented.

4. Functions

In addition to the functions specified elsewhere in this Agreement, the IVG shall:

- i. Take appropriate measures based on the reports it receives from the MF,
- ii. Assist the Parties in implementing the Agreement and preempt and promptly mediate disputes on the ground.

5. Termination

In accordance with the progress in the implementation of this Agreement, and with the fulfillment of the specific mandated functions, the IVG shall terminate its activities in the said spheres. The IVG shall continue to exist unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

Article 4 – Territory

1. The International Borders between the States of Palestine and Israel

- i. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis as set forth in attached Map 1.
- ii. The Parties recognize the border, as set out in attached Map 1, as the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between them.

2. Sovereignty and Inviolability

- i. The Parties recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace. They shall respect this inviolability in accordance with this Agreement, the UN Charter, and other rules of international law.
- ii. The Parties recognize each other's rights in their exclusive economic zones in accordance with international law.

3. Israeli Withdrawal

- i. Israel shall withdraw in accordance with Article 5.
- ii. Palestine shall assume responsibility for the areas from which Israel withdraws.
- iii. The transfer of authority from Israel to Palestine shall be in accordance with Annex X.
- iv. The IVG shall monitor, verify, and facilitate the implementation of this Article.

4. Demarcation

- i. A Joint Technical Border Commission (Commission) composed of the two Parties shall be established to conduct the technical demarcation of the border in accordance with this Article. The procedures governing the work of this Commission are set forth in Annex X.
- ii. Any disagreement in the Commission shall be referred to the IVG in accordance with Annex X.
- iii. The physical demarcation of the international borders shall be completed by the Commission not later than nine months from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement.

5. Settlements

- i. The state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory.

- ii. The resettlement shall be completed according to the schedule stipulated in Article 5.
- iii. Existing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding Israeli settlers and settlements, including security, shall remain in force in each of the settlements until the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of the relevant settlement.
- iv. Modalities for the assumption of authority over settlements by Palestine are set forth in Annex X. The IVG shall resolve any disputes that may arise during its implementation.
- v. Israel shall keep intact the immovable property, infrastructure and facilities in Israeli settlements to be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty. An agreed inventory shall be drawn up by the Parties with the IVG in advance of the completion of the evacuation and in accordance with Annex X.
- vi. The state of Palestine shall have exclusive title to all land and any buildings, facilities, infrastructure or other property remaining in any of the settlements on the date prescribed in the timetable for the completion of the evacuation of this settlement.

6. Corridor

- i. The states of Palestine and Israel shall establish a corridor linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This corridor shall:
 - a. Be under Israeli sovereignty.
 - b. Be permanently open.
 - c. Be under Palestinian administration in accordance with Annex X of this Agreement. Palestinian law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to the corridor.
 - d. Not disrupt Israeli transportation and other infrastructural networks, or endanger the environment, public safety or public health. Where necessary, engineering solutions will be sought to avoid such disruptions.
 - e. Allow for the establishment of the necessary infrastructural facilities linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Infrastructural facilities shall be understood to include, inter alia, pipelines, electrical and communications cables, and associated equipment as detailed in Annex X.
 - f. Not be used in contravention of this Agreement.
- ii. Defensive barriers shall be established along the corridor and Palestinians shall not enter Israel from this corridor, nor shall Israelis enter Palestine from the corridor.
- iii. The Parties shall seek the assistance of the international community in securing the financing for the corridor.

- iv. The IVG shall guarantee the implementation of this Article in accordance with Annex X.
- v. Any disputes arising between the Parties from the operation of the corridor shall be resolved in accordance with Article 16.
- vi. The arrangements set forth in this clause may only be terminated or revised by agreement of both Parties.

Article 5 – Security

1. General Security Provisions

- i. The Parties acknowledge that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their bilateral relations and will further enhance regional security. Palestine and Israel shall base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust, good neighborly relations, and the protection of their joint interests.
- ii. Palestine and Israel each shall:
 - a. Recognize and respect the other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from the threat or acts of war, terrorism and violence;
 - b. refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other and shall settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;
 - c. refrain from joining, assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organization or alliance of a military or security character, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of hostility against the other;
 - d. refrain from organizing, encouraging, or allowing the formation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries and militias within their respective territory and prevent their establishment. In this respect, any existing irregular forces or armed bands shall be disbanded and prevented from reforming at any future date;
 - e. refrain from organizing, assisting, allowing, or participating in acts of violence in or against the other or acquiescing in activities directed toward the commission of such acts.
- iii. To further security cooperation, the Parties shall establish a high level Joint Security Committee that shall meet on at least a monthly basis. The Joint Security Committee shall have a permanent joint office, and may establish such sub-committees as it deems necessary, including sub-committees to immediately resolve localized tensions.

2. Regional Security

- i. Israel and Palestine shall work together with their neighbors and the international community to build a secure and stable Middle East, free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting, and stable peace, characterized by reconciliation, goodwill, and the renunciation of the use of force.
- ii. To this end, the Parties shall work together to establish a regional security regime.

3. Defense Characteristics of the Palestinian State

- i. No armed forces, other than as specified in this Agreement, will be deployed or stationed in Palestine.
- ii. Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force. Accordingly, the limitations on the weapons that may be purchased, owned, or used by the Palestinian Security Force (PSF) or manufactured in Palestine shall be specified in Annex X. Any proposed changes to Annex X shall be considered by a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the MF. If no agreement is reached in the trilateral committee, the IVG may make its own recommendations.
 - a. No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF and the organs of the IVG, including the MF, may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons except as provided by law.
- iii. The PSF shall:
 - a. Maintain border control;
 - b. Maintain law-and-order and perform police functions;
 - c. Perform intelligence and security functions;
 - d. Prevent terrorism;
 - e. Conduct rescue and emergency missions; and
 - f. Supplement essential community services when necessary.
- iv. The MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.

4. Terrorism

- i. The Parties reject and condemn terrorism and violence in all its forms and shall pursue public policies accordingly. In addition, the parties shall refrain from actions and policies that are liable to nurture extremism and create conditions conducive to terrorism on either side.
- ii. The Parties shall take joint and, in their respective territories, unilateral comprehensive and continuous efforts against all aspects of violence and terrorism. These efforts shall include the prevention and preemption of such acts, and the prosecution of their perpetrators.
- iii. To that end, the Parties shall maintain ongoing consultation, cooperation, and exchange of information between their respective security forces.
- iv. A Trilateral Security Committee composed of the two Parties and the United States shall be formed to ensure the implementation of this Article. The Trilateral Security Committee shall develop comprehensive policies and guidelines to fight terrorism and violence.

5. Incitement

- i. Without prejudice to freedom of expression and other internationally recognized human rights, Israel and Palestine shall promulgate laws to prevent incitement to irredentism, racism, terrorism and violence and vigorously enforce them.

- ii. The IVG shall assist the Parties in establishing guidelines for the implementation of this clause, and shall monitor the Parties' adherence thereto.

6. Multinational Force

- i. A Multinational Force (MF) shall be established to provide security guarantees to the Parties, act as a deterrent, and oversee the implementation of the relevant provisions of this Agreement.
- ii. The composition, structure and size of the MF are set forth in Annex X.
- iii. To perform the functions specified in this Agreement, the MF shall be deployed in the state of Palestine. The MF shall enter into the appropriate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the state of Palestine.
- iv. In accordance with this Agreement, and as detailed in Annex X, the MF shall:
 - a. In light of the non-militarized nature of the Palestinian state, protect the territorial integrity of the state of Palestine.
 - b. Serve as a deterrent against external attacks that could threaten either of the Parties.
 - c. Deploy observers to areas adjacent to the lines of the Israeli withdrawal during the phases of this withdrawal, in accordance with Annex X.
 - d. Deploy observers to monitor the territorial and maritime borders of the state of Palestine, as specified in clause 5/13.
 - e. Perform the functions on the Palestinian international border crossings specified in clause 5/12.
 - f. Perform the functions relating to the early warning stations as specified in clause 5/8.
 - g. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/3.
 - h. Perform the functions specified in clause 5/7.
 - i. Perform the functions specified in Article 10.
 - j. Help in the enforcement of anti-terrorism measures.
 - k. Help in the training of the PSF.

- v. In relation to the above, the MF shall report to and update the IVG in accordance with Annex X.
- vi. The MF shall only be withdrawn or have its mandate changed by agreement of the Parties.

7. Evacuation

- i. Israel shall withdraw all its military and security personnel and equipment, including landmines, and all persons employed to support them, and all military installations from the territory of the state of Palestine, except as otherwise agreed in Annex X, in stages.
- ii. The staged withdrawals shall commence immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be made in accordance with the timetable and modalities set forth in Annex X.
- iii. The stages shall be designed subject to the following principles:
 - a. The need to create immediate clear contiguity and facilitate the early implementation of Palestinian development plans.
 - b. Israel's capacity to relocate, house and absorb settlers. While costs and inconveniences are inherent in such a process, these shall not be unduly disruptive.
 - c. The need to construct and operationalize the border between the two states.
 - d. The introduction and effective functioning of the MF, in particular on the eastern border of the state of Palestine.
- iv. Accordingly, the withdrawal shall be implemented in the following stages:
 - a. The first stage shall include the areas of the state of Palestine, as defined in Map X, and shall be completed within 9 months.
 - b. The second and third stages shall include the remainder of the territory of the state of Palestine and shall be completed within 21 months of the end of the first stage.
- v. Israel shall complete its withdrawal from the territory of the state of Palestine within 30 months of the entry into force of this Agreement, and in accordance with this Agreement.
- vi. Israel will maintain a small military presence in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF and subject to the MF SOFA as detailed in Annex X for an additional 36 months. The stipulated period may be reviewed by the Parties in the event of relevant regional developments, and may be altered by the Parties' consent.

vii. In accordance with Annex X, the MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause.

8. Early Warning Stations

- i. Israel may maintain two EWS in the northern, and central West Bank at the locations set forth in Annex X.
- ii. The EWS shall be staffed by the minimal required number of Israeli personnel and shall occupy the minimal amount of land necessary for their operation as set forth in Annex X.
- iii. Access to the EWS will be guaranteed and escorted by the MF.
- iv. Internal security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of Israel. The perimeter security of the EWS shall be the responsibility of the MF.
- v. The MF and the PSF shall maintain a liaison presence in the EWS. The MF shall monitor and verify that the EWS is being used for purposes recognized by this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.
- vi. The arrangements set forth in this Article shall be subject to review in ten years, with any changes to be mutually agreed. Thereafter, there will be five-yearly reviews whereby the arrangements set forth in this Article may be extended by mutual consent.
- vii. If at any point during the period specified above a regional security regime is established, then the IVG may request that the Parties review whether to continue or revise operational uses for the EWS in light of these developments. Any such change will require the mutual consent of the Parties.

9. Airspace

i. Civil Aviation

- a. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.
- b. In addition, the Parties shall, upon entry into force of this Agreement, establish a trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and the IVG to design the most efficient management system for civil aviation, including those relevant aspects of the air traffic control system. In the absence of consensus the IVG may make its own recommendations.

ii. Training

- a. The Israeli Air Force shall be entitled to use the Palestinian sovereign airspace for training purposes in accordance with

Annex X, which shall be based on rules pertaining to IAF use of Israeli airspace.

- b. The IVG shall monitor and verify compliance with this clause. Either Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.
- c. The arrangements set forth in this clause shall be subject to review every ten years, and may be altered or terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

10. Electromagnetic Sphere

- i. Neither Party's use of the electromagnetic sphere may interfere with the other Party's use.
- ii. Annex X shall detail arrangements relating to the use of the electromagnetic sphere.
- iii. The IVG shall monitor and verify the implementation of this clause and Annex X.
- iv. Any Party may submit a complaint to the IVG whose decision shall be conclusive.

11. Law Enforcement

The Israeli and Palestinian law enforcement agencies shall cooperate in combating illicit drug trafficking, illegal trafficking in archaeological artifacts and objects of arts, cross-border crime, including theft and fraud, organized crime, trafficking in women and minors, counterfeiting, pirate TV and radio stations, and other illegal activity.

12. International Border Crossings

- i. The following arrangements shall apply to borders crossing between the state of Palestine and Jordan, the state of Palestine and Egypt, as well as airport and seaport entry points to the state of Palestine.
- ii. All border crossings shall be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the PSF and the MF. These teams shall prevent the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials or equipment that are in contravention of the provisions of this Agreement.
- iii. The MF representatives and the PSF will have, jointly and separately, the authority to block the entry into Palestine of any such items. If at any time a disagreement regarding the entrance of goods or materials arises between the PSF and the MF representatives, the PSF may bring the matter to the IVG, whose binding conclusions shall be rendered within 24 hours.
- iv. This arrangement shall be reviewed by the IVG after 5 years to determine its continuation, modification or termination. Thereafter, the Palestinian party may request such a review on an annual basis.

- v. In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action.
- vi. For the following two years, these arrangements will continue in a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the procedures outlined in this clause.
- vii. In cargo terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action. If the Israeli side is not satisfied by the MF-PSF action, it may demand that the cargo be detained pending a decision by an MF inspector. The MF inspector's decision shall be binding and final, and shall be rendered within 12 hours of the Israeli complaint.
- viii. For the following three years, these arrangements will continue from a specially designated facility in Israel, utilizing appropriate technology. This shall not cause delays beyond the timelines outlined in this clause.
- ix. A high level trilateral committee composed of representatives of Palestine, Israel, and the IVG shall meet regularly to monitor the application of these procedures and correct any irregularities, and may be convened on request.
- x. The details of the above are set forth in Annex X.

13. Border Control

- i. The PSF shall maintain border control as detailed in Annex X.
- ii. The MF shall monitor and verify the maintenance of border control by the PSF.

Article 6 – Jerusalem

1. Religious and Cultural Significance:

- i. The Parties recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural significance of Jerusalem and its holiness enshrined in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In recognition of this status, the Parties reaffirm their commitment to safeguard the character, holiness, and freedom of worship in the city and to respect the existing division of administrative functions and traditional practices between different denominations.
- ii. The Parties shall establish an inter-faith body consisting of representatives of the three monotheistic faiths, to act as a consultative body to the Parties on matters related to the city's religious significance and to promote inter-religious understanding and dialogue. The composition, procedures, and modalities for this body are set forth in Annex X.

2. Capital of Two States

The Parties shall have their mutually recognized capitals in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.

3. Sovereignty

Sovereignty in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with attached Map 2. This shall not prejudice nor be prejudiced by the arrangements set forth below.

4. Border Regime:

The border regime shall be designed according to the provisions of Article 11, and taking into account the specific needs of Jerusalem (e.g., movement of tourists and intensity of border crossing use including provisions for Jerusalemites) and the provisions of this Article.

5. al-Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount (Compound)

- i. International Group
 - a. An International Group, composed of the IVG and other parties to be agreed upon by the Parties, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), shall hereby be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of this clause.
 - b. For this purpose, the International Group shall establish a Multinational Presence on the Compound, the composition, structure, mandate and functions of which are set forth in Annex X.
 - c. The Multinational Presence shall have specialized detachments dealing with security and conservation. The Multinational Presence shall make periodic conservation and security reports to the International Group. These reports shall be made public.
 - d. The Multinational Presence shall strive to immediately resolve any problems arising and may refer any unresolved disputes to the

International Group that will function in accordance with Article 16.

- e. The Parties may at any time request clarifications or submit complaints to the International Group which shall be promptly investigated and acted upon.
- f. The International Group shall draw up rules and regulations to maintain security on and conservation of the Compound. These shall include lists of the weapons and equipment permitted on the site.

ii. Regulations Regarding the Compound

- a. In view of the sanctity of the Compound, and in light of the unique religious and cultural significance of the site to the Jewish people, there shall be no digging, excavation, or construction on the Compound, unless approved by the two Parties. Procedures for regular maintenance and emergency repairs on the Compound shall be established by the IG after consultation with the Parties.
- b. The state of Palestine shall be responsible for maintaining the security of the Compound and for ensuring that it will not be used for any hostile acts against Israelis or Israeli areas. The only arms permitted on the Compound shall be those carried by the Palestinian security personnel and the security detachment of the Multinational Presence.
- c. In light of the universal significance of the Compound, and subject to security considerations and to the need not to disrupt religious worship or decorum on the site as determined by the Waqf, visitors shall be allowed access to the site. This shall be without any discrimination and generally be in accordance with past practice.

iii. Transfer of Authority

- a. At the end of the withdrawal period stipulated in Article 5/7, the state of Palestine shall assert sovereignty over the Compound.
- b. The International Group and its subsidiary organs shall continue to exist and fulfill all the functions stipulated in this Article unless otherwise agreed by the two Parties.

6. The Wailing Wall

The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty.

7. The Old City:

i. **Significance of the Old City**

- a. The Parties view the Old City as one whole enjoying a unique character. The Parties agree that the preservation of this unique character together with safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the inhabitants should guide the administration of the Old City.

- b. The Parties shall act in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List regulations, in which the Old City is a registered site.

ii. **IVG Role in the Old City**

a. **Cultural Heritage**

1. The IVG shall monitor and verify the preservation of cultural heritage in the Old City in accordance with the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List rules. For this purpose, the IVG shall have free and unimpeded access to sites, documents, and information related to the performance of this function.
2. The IVG shall work in close coordination with the Old City Committee of the Jerusalem Coordination and Development Committee (JCDC), including in devising a restoration and preservation plan for the Old City.

b. **Policing**

1. The IVG shall establish an Old City Policing Unit (PU) to liaise with, coordinate between, and assist the Palestinian and Israeli police forces in the Old City, to defuse localized tensions and help resolve disputes, and to perform policing duties in locations specified in and according to operational procedures detailed in Annex X.
2. The PU shall periodically report to the IVG.

- c. Either Party may submit complaints in relation to this clause to the IVG, which shall promptly act upon them in accordance with Article 16.

iii. **Free Movement within the Old City**

Movement within the Old City shall be free and unimpeded subject to the provisions of this article and rules and regulations pertaining to the various holy sites.

iv. **Entry into and Exit from the Old City**

- a. Entry and exit points into and from the Old City will be staffed by the authorities of the state under whose sovereignty the point falls, with the presence of PU members, unless otherwise specified.
- b. With a view to facilitating movement into the Old City, each Party shall take such measures at the entry points in its territory as to ensure the preservation of security in the Old City. The PU shall monitor the operation of the entry points.
- c. Citizens of either Party may not exit the Old City into the territory of the other Party unless they are in possession of the relevant documentation that entitles them to. Tourists may only exit the Old

City into the territory of the Party which they possess valid authorization to enter.

v. Suspension, Termination, and Expansion

- a. Either Party may suspend the arrangements set forth in Article 6.7.iii in cases of emergency for one week. The extension of such suspension for longer than a week shall be pursuant to consultation with the other Party and the IVG at the Trilateral Committee established in Article 3/3.
- b. This clause shall not apply to the arrangements set forth in Article 6/7/vi.
- c. Three years after the transfer of authority over the Old City, the Parties shall review these arrangements. These arrangements may only be terminated by agreement of the Parties.
- d. The Parties shall examine the possibility of expanding these arrangements beyond the Old City and may agree to such an expansion.

vi. Special Arrangements

- a. Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, and security, as set forth in Annex X.
 1. The IVG shall be responsible for the implementation of these arrangements.
- b. Without prejudice to Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli administration of the Citadel will be as outlined in Annex X.

vii. Color-Coding of the Old City

A visible color-coding scheme shall be used in the Old City to denote the sovereign areas of the respective Parties.

viii. Policing

- a. An agreed number of Israeli police shall constitute the Israeli Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Israeli sovereignty.
- b. An agreed number of Palestinian police shall constitute the Palestinian Old City police detachment and shall exercise responsibility for maintaining order and day-to-day policing functions in the area under Palestinian sovereignty.

- c. All members of the respective Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments shall undergo special training, including joint training exercises, to be administered by the PU.
- d. A special Joint Situation Room, under the direction of the PU and incorporating members of the Israeli and Palestinian Old City police detachments, shall facilitate liaison on all relevant matters of policing and security in the Old City.

ix. Arms

No person shall be allowed to carry or possess arms in the Old City, with the exception of the Police Forces provided for in this agreement. In addition, each Party may grant special written permission to carry or possess arms in areas under its sovereignty.

x. Intelligence and Security

- a. The Parties shall establish intensive intelligence cooperation regarding the Old City, including the immediate sharing of threat information.
- b. A trilateral committee composed of the two Parties and representatives of the United States shall be established to facilitate this cooperation.

8. Mount of Olives Cemetery:

- i. The area outlined in Map X (the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives) shall be under Israeli administration; Israeli law shall apply to persons using and procedures appertaining to this area in accordance with Annex X.
 - a. There shall be a designated road to provide free, unlimited, and unimpeded access to the Cemetery.
 - b. The IVG shall monitor the implementation of this clause.
 - c. This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

9. Special Cemetery Arrangements

Arrangements shall be established in the two cemeteries designated in Map X (Mount Zion Cemetery and the German Colony Cemetery), to facilitate and ensure the continuation of the current burial and visitation practices, including the facilitation of access.

10. The Western Wall Tunnel

- i. The Western Wall Tunnel designated in Map X shall be under Israeli administration, including:
 - a. Unrestricted Israeli access and right to worship and conduct religious practices.

- b. Responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of the site in accordance with this Agreement and without damaging structures above, under IVG supervision.
 - c. Israeli policing.
 - d. IVG monitoring
 - e. The Northern Exit of the Tunnel shall only be used for exit and may only be closed in case of emergency as stipulated in Article 6/7.
- ii. This arrangement may only be terminated by the agreement of both Parties.

II. Municipal Coordination

- i. The two Jerusalem municipalities shall form a Jerusalem Co-ordination and Development Committee ("JCDC") to oversee the cooperation and coordination between the Palestinian Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. The JCDC and its sub-committees shall be composed of an equal number of representatives from Palestine and Israel. Each side will appoint members of the JCDC and its subcommittees in accordance with its own modalities.
- ii. The JCDC shall ensure that the coordination of infrastructure and services best serves the residents of Jerusalem, and shall promote the economic development of the city to the benefit of all. The JCDC will act to encourage cross-community dialogue and reconciliation.
- iii. The JCDC shall have the following subcommittees:
 - a. A Planning and Zoning Committee: to ensure agreed planning and zoning regulations in areas designated in Annex X.
 - b. A Hydro Infrastructure Committee: to handle matters relating to drinking water delivery, drainage, and wastewater collection and treatment.
 - c. A Transport Committee: to coordinate relevant connectedness and compatibility of the two road systems and other issues pertaining to transport.
 - d. An Environmental Committee: to deal with environmental issues affecting the quality of life in the city, including solid waste management.
 - e. An Economic and Development Committee: to formulate plans for economic development in areas of joint interest, including in the areas of transportation, seam line commercial cooperation, and tourism,

- f. A Police and Emergency Services Committee: to coordinate measures for the maintenance of public order and crime prevention and the provision of emergency services;
- g. An Old City Committee: to plan and closely coordinate the joint provision of the relevant municipal services, and other functions stipulated in Article 6/7.
- h. Other Committees as agreed in the JCDC.

12. Israeli Residency of Palestinian Jerusalemites

Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon the transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside.

13. Transfer of authority

The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of East Jerusalem.

Article 7 – Refugees

1. Significance of the Refugee Problem

- i. The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.
- ii. Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.

2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative

- i. The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.

3. Compensation

- i. Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee's permanent place of residence.
- ii. The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.

4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR)

The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows;

- i. The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below.
- ii. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below.
- iii. Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below.
- iv. The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below.
- v. Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below.
 - a. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.
 - b. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.

- c. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.
- d. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities

Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.

5. Free and Informed Choice

The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees' free choice in expressing their preferences, and to countering any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

6. End of Refugee Status

Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee's permanent place of residence (PPR) as determined by the International Commission.

7. End of Claims

This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.

8. International Role

The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.

9. Property Compensation

- i. Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement.
- ii. The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows:
 - a. The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement.

- b. The Panel of Experts shall base its assessment on the UNCCP records, the records of the Custodian for Absentee Property, and any other records it deems relevant. The Parties shall make these records available to the Panel.
 - c. The Parties shall appoint experts to advise and assist the Panel in its work.
 - d. Within 6 months, the Panel shall submit its estimates to the Parties.
 - e. The Parties shall agree on an economic multiplier, to be applied to the estimates, to reach a fair aggregate value of the property.
- iii. The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli "lump sum" contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel.
 - iv. Israel's contribution shall be made in installments in accordance with Schedule X.
 - v. The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel's contribution to the International Fund. An estimation of this value shall be made by the International Fund, taking into account assessment of damage caused by the settlements.

10. Compensation for Refugeehood

- i. A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual's refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission. The structure and financing of the Fund is set forth in Annex X.
- ii. Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.

11. The International Commission (Commission)

- i. Mandate and Composition
 - a. An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.
 - b. In addition to themselves, the Parties call upon the United Nations, the United States, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Japan, the World Bank, the Russian Federation, and others to be the members of the Commission.

- c. The Commission shall:
 - 1. Oversee and manage the process whereby the status and PPR of Palestinian refugees is determined and realized.
 - 2. Oversee and manage, in close cooperation with the host states, the rehabilitation and development programs.
 - 3. Raise and disburse funds as appropriate.
- d. The Parties shall make available to the Commission all relevant documentary records and archival materials in their possession that it deems necessary for the functioning of the Commission and its organs. The Commission may request such materials from all other relevant parties and bodies, including, inter alia, UNCCP and UNRWA.

ii. Structure

- a. The Commission shall be governed by an Executive Board (Board) composed of representatives of its members.
- b. The Board shall be the highest authority in the Commission and shall make the relevant policy decisions in accordance with this Agreement.
- c. The Board shall draw up the procedures governing the work of the Commission in accordance with this Agreement.
- d. The Board shall oversee the conduct of the various Committees of the Commission. The said Committees shall periodically report to the Board in accordance with procedures set forth thereby.
- e. The Board shall create a Secretariat and appoint a Chair thereof. The Chair and the Secretariat shall conduct the day-to-day operation of the Commission.

iii. Specific Committees

- a. The Commission shall establish the Technical Committees specified below.
- b. Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the Board shall determine the structure and procedures of the Committees.
- c. The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary.
- d. The Committees shall establish mechanisms for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement relating to refugees.
- e. The Committees shall function in accordance with this Agreement, and shall render binding decisions accordingly.

- f. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions affecting them according to mechanisms established by this Agreement and detailed in Annex X.
- iv. Status-determination Committee :
- a. The Status-determination Committee shall be responsible for verifying refugee status.
 - b. UNRWA registration shall be considered as rebuttable presumption (prima facie proof) of refugee status.
- v. Compensation Committee :
- a. The Compensation Committee shall be responsible for administering the implementation of the compensation provisions.
 - b. The Committee shall disburse compensation for individual property pursuant to the following modalities:
 - 1. Either a fixed per capita award for property claims below a specified value. This will require the claimant to only prove title, and shall be processed according to a fast-track procedure, or
 - 2. A claims-based award for property claims exceeding a specified value for immovables and other assets. This will require the claimant to prove both title and the value of the losses.
 - c. Annex X shall elaborate the details of the above including, but not limited to, evidentiary issues and the use of UNCCP, "Custodian for Absentees' Property", and UNRWA records, along with any other relevant records.
- vi. Host State Remuneration Committee:
There shall be remuneration for host states.
- vii. Permanent Place of Residence Committee (PPR Committee):
The PPR Committee shall,
- a. Develop with all the relevant parties detailed programs regarding the implementation of the PPR options pursuant to Article 7/4 above.
 - b. Assist the applicants in making an informed choice regarding PPR options.
 - c. Receive applications from refugees regarding PPR. The applicants must indicate a number of preferences in accordance with article 7/4 above. The applications shall be received no later than two years after the start of the International Commission's operations. Refugees who do not submit such applications within the two-year period shall lose their refugee status.

- d. Determine, in accordance with sub-Article (a) above, the PPR of the applicants, taking into account individual preferences and maintenance of family unity. Applicants who do not avail themselves of the Committee's PPR determination shall lose their refugee status.
- e. Provide the applicants with the appropriate technical and legal assistance.
- f. The PPR of Palestinian refugees shall be realized within 5 years of the start of the International Commission's operations.

viii. **Refugeehood Fund Committee**

The Refugeehood Fund Committee shall implement Article 7/10 as detailed in Annex X.

ix. **Rehabilitation and Development Committee**

In accordance with the aims of this Agreement and noting the above PPR programs, the Rehabilitation and Development Committee shall work closely with Palestine, Host Countries and other relevant third countries and parties in pursuing the goal of refugee rehabilitation and community development. This shall include devising programs and plans to provide the former refugees with opportunities for personal and communal development, housing, education, healthcare, re-training and other needs. This shall be integrated in the general development plans for the region.

12. The International Fund

- i. An International Fund (the Fund) shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this Article and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions. The Fund shall audit the Commission's work.
- ii. The structure, composition and operation of the Fund are set forth in Annex X.

13. UNRWA

- i. UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country.
- ii. UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission's operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.

14. Reconciliation Programs

- i. The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for

exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past.

- ii. The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society.
- iii. The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.
- iv. These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating those villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.

Article 8 – Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC)

1. The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee immediately upon the entry into force of this agreement. The IPCC shall be a ministerial-level body with ministerial-level Co-Chairs.
2. The IPCC shall develop and assist in the implementation of policies for cooperation in areas of common interest including, but not limited to, infrastructure needs, sustainable development and environmental issues, cross-border municipal cooperation, border area industrial parks, exchange programs, human resource development, sports and youth, science, agriculture and culture.
3. The IPCC shall strive to broaden the spheres and scope of cooperation between the Parties.

Article 9 – Designated Road Use Arrangements:

1. The following arrangements for Israeli civilian use will apply to the designated roads in Palestine as detailed in Map X (Road 443, Jerusalem to Tiberias via Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem –Ein Gedi).
2. These arrangements shall not prejudice Palestinian jurisdiction over these roads, including PSF patrols.
3. The procedures for designated road use arrangements will be further detailed in Annex X.
4. Israelis may be granted permits for use of designated roads. Proof of authorization may be presented at entry points to the designated roads. The sides will review options for establishing a road use system based on smart card technology.
5. The designated roads will be patrolled by the MF at all times. The MF will establish with the states of Israel and Palestine agreed arrangements for cooperation in emergency medical evacuation of Israelis.
6. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon as part of the legal cooperation between the two states. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.
7. Israelis shall not use the designated roads as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.
8. In the event of regional peace, arrangements for Palestinian civilian use of designated roads in Israel shall be agreed and come into effect.

Article 10 – Sites of Religious Significance

1. The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.
2. Access to and from the sites will be by way of designated shuttle facilities from the relevant border crossing to the sites.
3. The Parties shall agree on requirements and procedures for granting licenses to authorized private shuttle operators.
4. The shuttles and passengers will be subject to MF inspection.
5. The shuttles will be escorted on their route between the border crossing and the sites by the MF.
6. The shuttles shall be under the traffic regulations and jurisdiction of the Party in whose territory they are traveling.
7. Arrangements for access to the sites on special days and holidays are detailed in Annex X.
8. The Palestinian Tourist Police and the MF will be present at these sites.
9. The Parties shall establish a joint body for the religious administration of these sites.
10. In the event of any incidents involving Israeli citizens and requiring criminal or legal proceedings, there will be full cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities according to arrangements to be agreed upon. The Parties may call on the IVG to assist in this respect.
11. Israelis shall not use the shuttles as a means of entering Palestine without the relevant documentation and authorization.
12. The Parties shall protect and preserve the sites of religious significance listed in Annex X and shall facilitate visitation to the cemeteries listed in Annex X.

Article 11 – Border Regime

1. There shall be a border regime between the two states, with movement between them subject to the domestic legal requirements of each and to the provisions of this Agreement as detailed in Annex X.
2. Movement across the border shall only be through designated border crossings.
3. Procedures in border crossings shall be designed to facilitate strong trade and economic ties, including labor movement between the Parties.
4. Each Party shall each, in its respective territory, take the measures it deems necessary to ensure that no persons, vehicles, or goods enter the territory of the other illegally.
5. Special border arrangements in Jerusalem shall be in accordance with Article 6 above.

Article 12 – Water

Article 13 – Economic Relations

Article 14 – Legal Cooperation

Article 15 – Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees

1. In the context of this Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and Palestine, the end of conflict, cessation of all violence, and the robust security arrangements set forth in this Agreement, all the Palestinian and Arab prisoners detained in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prior to the date of signature of this Agreement, DD/MM/2003, shall be released in accordance with the categories set forth below and detailed in Annex X.
 - i. Category A: all persons imprisoned prior to the start of the implementation of the Declaration of Principles on May 4, 1994, administrative detainees, and minors, as well as women, and prisoners in ill health shall be released immediately upon the entry into force of this Agreement.
 - ii. Category B: all persons imprisoned after May 4, 1994 and prior to the signature of this Agreement shall be released no later than eighteen months from the entry into force of this Agreement, except those specified in Category C.
 - iii. Category C: Exceptional cases – persons whose names are set forth in Annex X – shall be released in thirty months at the end of the full implementation of the territorial aspects of this Agreement set forth in Article 5/7/v.

Article 16 – Dispute Settlement Mechanism

1. Disputes related to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be resolved by negotiations within a bilateral framework to be convened by the High Steering Committee.
2. If a dispute is not settled promptly by the above, either Party may submit it to mediation and conciliation by the IVG mechanism in accordance with Article 3.
3. Disputes which cannot be settled by bilateral negotiation and/or the IVG mechanism shall be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the Parties.
4. Disputes which have not been resolved by the above may be submitted by either Party to an arbitration panel. Each Party shall nominate one member of the three-member arbitration panel. The Parties shall select a third arbiter from the agreed list of arbiters set forth in Annex X either by consensus or, in the case of disagreement, by rotation.

Article 17 – Final Clauses

Including a final clause providing for a UNSCR/UNGAR resolution endorsing the agreement and superceding the previous UN resolutions.

The English version of this text will be considered authoritative.

Dear Isaac,

Nisi and I are eagerly anticipating tomorrow's meeting with you.

The following are questions, thoughts we have in mind/work with, when talking with people
They are in no particular order, and have never been read by anyone other than us.
I haven't edited or put them in any particular order,, just jotted down as they came to us... some
may be redundant... so please forgive!

How would you have been a different person without the war?

What "lessons" about humanity did the war teach you?

Did you ever ask yourself why did this happen (to you?)

"going like sheep to the slaughterhouse." how do you feel about that statement?

Do you think murder is ever justifiable?

Were you religious before?
Did that change after the war?

To what do you attribute your survival?
qualities inside yourself?
others' help?
good fortune?
destiny?

What "positive" attributes did you learn about yourself?
"negative?"

What decisions did you make after the war? about your life? about people?

(If you have children/grandchildren.)
how did you treat the subject with your children? grandchildren?
what did you tell them?
what do/did you want them to know about yourself?

do you feel a "debt" to anyone?
do you feel anyone "owes" you something?

feelings about Israel,
feelings about the U.S.

feelings about Germans, Poles, other nationalities/cultures?

feelings about Arabs, Palestinians,

how do you feel about the notion of forgiveness?

what does forgiveness mean to you?
is it necessary?
how do you go about forgiving?
forgiveness of self?
forgiveness of others?

how do you feel about other genocides,
in Rwanda?
now in Sudan?

why do you think there is Anti-Semitism? any hatred?

do you feel any hatred for a group of people?

have you ever felt you had within yourself the capacity for violence? rage?
have you expressed it? how?

nightmares,
"daymares"

what scars do you feel you were left with?

any family members survive?

why do you think you survived?
was it destiny? chance?

spiritual realizations?

do you believe in a life after this life?
do you believe in "past lives"

How do you feel about being Jewish?
about being German? Polish?
what does it mean to you?

would you ever pretend you're not what you are, in order to survive?
your name changed?

what does loss mean to you?
how have you coped with the losses?

what do you love of/about/in your life?
what does joy mean to you?
what does fulfillment mean to you?

where/how do you draw pleasure in your life?

over the years, did you talk about your experiences?
with whom?
did you feel understood?
do you think it's important to do so?

what would YOU like to tell us?

what do you think we DON'T know about this time?
can't know because of lack of that experience?

what would you like the world to know that you feel you have insight into, as a result of this experience?

what inner strength did you draw on, in order to survive?
what sustained you?

did you believe you would survive?

could you see beyond that time? into future?

had you been raised with spiritual beliefs in order to be able to draw from?

How has your experience of the Holocaust shaped your sense of nationality, ie. Do you consider yourself a German-Jew, a Polish-Jew, a Hungarian-Jew, or an American-Jew, etc.
Do you identify the part of yourself which is a native to a specific country from which you were expelled, or have you left that behind and had to reinvent, recreate, a sense of nationality here in the US or if/when you lived in Israel, as an Israeli?

Are you confident that Jews are safe and welcome here in the US?

Do you feel yourself as an American with no roots in your 'old' country, or do you long for and remember often the country in which you were born? How do you create resolution between these conflicting or different parts of your self identity? Do you feel yourself as a Jew from a very specific and unique place so that German and Polish Jews etc., seem almost like people from another country or does the basis that you are all Jews unite you more strongly than any one nation you all came from?

Also, like Otto Frank, he really adopted Amsterdam and Holland as some profound haven, and returned there after the camps. Do you feel any strong regard for a particular country or people?

Or like Marisha, do you feel that you 'belong nowhere'.... have no specific concrete home other than Israel and your particular small community?

Also! Which if any non-Jews would you say risked their lives to save and protect you?

See you tomorrow.

Best,

Hedda



ingeborg and isaac zieman

From: "lara weitzman" <laraweitzman@earthlink.net>
To: <izieman@mindspring.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 11, 2005 9:17 PM
Subject: Fwd: Meeting with Rep. Rangel Rescheduled to 1:30 pm

Begin forwarded message:

From: Gil Kulick <gil_kulick@yahoo.com>
Date: Fri Dec 9, 2005 2:17:51 PM US/Eastern
To: Gil Kulick <gil_kulick@yahoo.com>, estweiser@aol.com, embroner@aol.com, dfleshler@strategy-xxi.com, karen_abrams@yahoo.com, Carinne Luck <carinne@btvshalom.org>
Cc: Lara Weitzman <laraweitzman@earthlink.net>, Alison Pepper <ketura1973@aol.com>, anita altman <altmana@ujafedny.org>
Subject: Re: Meeting with Rep. Rangel Rescheduled to 1:30 pm

Because Rep. Rangel needs to testify at the City Council around noon, his office has asked to reschedule our meeting to 1:30 pm. His office urged strongly that we stick to this time rather than trying to reschedule for a later date. I hope this will not conflict seriously with anyone's other commitments and that you will make every effort to stick with the meeting. If you will be unable to meet at 1:30 (and thus at 12:30 at Starbucks), please let me know urgently. If I don't hear from you soon, I'll assume I'll see you at Starbucks at 12:30.

We've put a lot of effort into setting up this meeting. Let's do all we can to make it successful.

Many thanks,
Gil

Gil Kulick <gil_kulick@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear Friends ,

Thank you all for joining the Brit Tzedek delegation that will meet with Congressman Rangel on Monday, December 12, at **12 NOON** (Note new time.) His office is at 163 West 125 Street. I hope this slight change in timing works for everyone, but if not, please let me know ASAP. (Karen, I'll call you about your timing problem.)

Here is the agenda for the meeting:

- Introduce members of the delegation (Gil and all)
- Give brief history and national program of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace (Carinne)
- Introduce Brit Tzedek's New York City chapter, present letter from local rabbi (Gil and Carinne)
- Present Brit Tzedek's views on the Israeli-Palestinian search for peace (Carinne and

12/11/05

others, to be decided before the meeting)

- Explain why we, as American, as Jews, and as voters, believe that the United States government, both executive and legislative branches, has a vital role to play in that effort. (Dan)
- Thank Mr. Rangel for signing (attached)Hyde-Capps letter to Condoleezza Rice (Gil) (see also http://ga3.org/campaign/hyde_capps/bd358w2o5bj68j)
- Response from Mr. Rangel

An hour before the meeting (at 11 am) we will meet at Starbucks at Lennox Avenue and 125th Street to discuss the strategy for the meeting, go over the talking points, and divide up the labor. Everyone will, I hope, be prepared to play an active role in the dialogue. Needless to say, we should be appropriately attired.

Carinne Luck, Brit Tzedek's very sharp and effective Chapter Organizer, will be the co-leader of the delegation. Carinne qwill handle aquestions like how do we differ from AIPAC or from other Jewish peace organizations (e.g., APN, IPF).

I have attached some important background information, most importantly the talking points which lay out Brit Tzedek's views on various issues. Also, some notes from a recent New York City Chapter recent meeting with Rep. Jerry Nadler's staff and a summary of important by Yossi Beilin at a recent event at B'nai Jeshurun

Please read through these materials thoroughly and spend some time at the Brit Tzedek web site, www.btvshalom.org, to familiarize yourself with the organization's stance on key issues.

Please contact me and/or Carinne (Carinne@btvshalom.org) with any questions, procedural or substantive you might have. You can can reach me by phone over the weekend, snow permitting, at 845-647-3007. Snow not permitting, I'll be at 212-866-7570.

B'Shalom,
Gil

Lara Weitzman
organization development & dynamics
371 Fort Washington Avenue, 4h
New York, NY 10033
212.923.5960

www.btvshalom.org

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ingeborg and isaac zieman

From: "NYC Chapter- Brit Tzedek v'Shalom" <nyc@btvshalom.org>
To: <btvs-nyc-btvshalom.org@lists.btvshalom.org>
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2005 10:49 PM
Attach: Nadler notes.doc
Subject: [BTvS-NYC] 3 NYC items

Dear NYC,

1. Attached to this email are the notes from the recent meeting with Rep. Nadler. It was an excellent meeting.

2. We are in the midst of setting up a meeting with Rep. Charles Rangel. If you want to be involved with this meeting or advocacy in general please email carinne at carinne@btvshalom.org.

3. Brit Tzedek National is beginning a "welcoming program." NYC is trial chapter. When people sign up for our emails or express interest in Brit Tzedek we are going to have current members call them and welcome them. The idea is that we would rather have our own members, who are committed to Brit Tzedek, making these calls instead of tele-marketers. Welcome callers will get paid \$10/hour. If you are interested please email Carinne at carinne@btvshalom.org

Thanks
Jen Klein
National VP
NYC Chapter Chair

NYC Chapter
Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
The Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
www.btvshalom.org

btvs-nyc mailing list
btvs-nyc@lists.btvshalom.org
<http://lists.btvshalom.org/listinfo.cgi/btvs-nyc-btvshalom.org>



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SECRETARY

Elliot Figman
TREASURER

ACTING
DIRECTOR

Aliza Becker

24 January 2003

Isaac Zieman
315 Central Park West, Apt. 6N
New York, NY 10025

Dear Isaac Zieman:

Thank you for joining Brit Tzedek v'Shalom. We appreciate your tax-deductible contribution of \$36.

In these times, it is crucial that the voices of a broad spectrum of American Jews be heard. Your support will help us create a vibrant organization which will articulate an alternative Jewish voice for a just peace in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

Danielle Luttenberg
Chair
Membership Committee

P.S. All new members are added to our email listserv to keep them informed about important Brit Tzedek activities. In checking our records, we see that we don't have your email address. Don't miss out on important developments - send your email address today to our listserv coordinator at membership@btvshalom.org. Please include your full name in your message. Many thanks!

הצהרת עקרונות

- אנחנו, ישראלים ופלסטינים, מצהירים במשותף כי:
- איננו מאמינים עוד שניתן להגיע לפתרון הסכסוך בדרכים אלימות. אנו קוראים להקמת מדינה פלסטינית לצד מדינת ישראל.
 - מעגל הדמים לא יפסק, אלא אם כן נפעל במשותף לסיום הכיבוש ולהפסקת כל סוג של אלימות.
 - נפעל בדרכים לא אלימות ונקרא לאי-אלימות, בשתי החברות.

إعلان مبادئ

- نحن إسرائيليون وفلسطينيون نعلن بشكل مشترك الآتي:
- لم نعد نعتقد أنه بالإمكان التوصل لحل الصراع بالعنف، وننادي بإقامة دولة فلسطينية مستقلة إلى جانب دولة إسرائيل تعيشان بسلام وأمن.
 - نؤمن بأن دائرة الدماء لن نتوقف إلا إذا عملنا معا لإنهاء الاحتلال ووقف كافة أنواع العنف.
 - سنناضل بطرق سلمية وننادي بعدم العنف، في كلا المجتمعين.

Declaration of Principles

- We no longer believe that it is possible to resolve the conflict through violent means. we call for the establishment of a palestinian state, along-side the state of Israel.
- The Israeli-Palestinian cycle of violence will not end, unless we act together to end the occupation and to stop all forms of violence.
- We will act in non-violent ways and will call for non-violence in both societies.

"... إذا أردت أن تصنع سلام مع عدوك، عليك أن تعمل معه سويا. بذلك فقط سيصبح شريكاً لك"

"نلسون مانديلا"

"... If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner".

Nelson Mandela



"... אם ברצונך לעשות שלום עם האוייב שלך, עליך לעבוד עימו יחד. רק כך הוא יהפוך לשותף".

נלסון מנדלה

للاتصال ليصيرت كسر Contact

زهر شبيرا • زهر شפيرا • Zohar Shapira

972-54-4608190

سليمان الحمري • سوليمان آل-حمري • Souliman Al-Hamri

970-59-9211363

contact@combatantsforpeace.org

www.combatantsforpeace.org

601

مقاتلي السلام
لוחמים לשלום



Combatants For Peace

WHO ARE WE?

The "Combatants for Peace" movement was started jointly by Palestinians and Israelis, who have taken an active part in the cycle of violence: Israelis as soldiers in the Israeli army and Palestinians as part of the violent struggle for Palestinian freedom.

After brandishing weapons for so many years, and having seen one another only through weapon sights, we have decided to put down our guns, and to fight for peace.



"... while I was watching the little girls playing on the earth mounds which blockade the village, I was talking by phone with my wife and she said to me: 'Don't even ask what happened, I don't have anyone to take Tamar from the nursery'... so maybe I was brought up with so much paranoia, that they all want to kill us, that I had to be 32 years old, in order to see Palestinian girls playing on an earth mound, in a village that I blockade, and only then did I understand, in the deepest way possible, that those girls weren't any different my little girl. At that point I understood that I wouldn't take part in this [occupation] any more, no matter what price I would have to pay".

Chen Alon, Major (res.)
at a meeting with Palestinian combat veterans



WE BELIEVE

That only by joint forces, we will be able to put an end to the cycle of violence, the bloodshed and the oppression of the Palestinian people.

We no longer believe that it is possible to resolve the conflict between the two peoples through violent means; therefore we declare that we refuse to take part any more in the mutual bloodletting.

We will act only by non-violent means so that each side will come to understand the national aspirations of the other side. We see dialogue and reconciliation as the only way to act in order to terminate the Israeli occupation and to halt the settlement project, in order to establish a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, alongside the State of Israel.

WHAT ARE OUR GOALS?

- To raise the consciousness in both publics regarding the hopes and suffering of the other side, and to create partners in dialogue.
- To educate towards reconciliation and non-violent struggle in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies.
- To create political pressure on both governments, in order to stop the cycle of violence and end the occupation.

HOW DO WE OPERATE?

Since the beginning of 2005 we have been organizing meetings between Israeli and Palestinian veterans, in which both sides tell about the violent actions that they have taken part in and about the turning point which led them to understand the limits of violence. Naturally, these meetings were fraught with many fears, however we soon learned that despite years of fear and hatred, there is more that unites us than divides.



"...when I was 14, my friend and I stabbed Israeli soldiers... I got out of prison after ten years and five months. Despite all the difficulties, the wall, the closures, the settlements etc., I set up with a few other people, a centre which will promote the concept of peace. We believe that the combatants are the ones who can make a change, since they have personally paid the price by their involvement".

Souliman El-Khatib, Fatah member
at a meeting with Israeli combat veterans



Therefore we have decided to act together in the following ways:

- To continue with the combatants' meetings, which allow each side to understand the other's narrative, via the approach of reconciliation rather than conflict.
- To implement an educational lecture series in public forums on both sides (universities, youth groups, schools etc.). The lectures will be given jointly by an Israeli and a Palestinian veteran, who will concentrate on the transition from violent struggle to the recognition of the limits of violence.
- To create joint projects which educate towards non-violence.
- To create joint frameworks in order to become familiar with the culture, history and current needs of the other nation.
- To set up Bi-National media teams, which will act in order to influence public opinion in Israel, Palestine and the rest of the world.
- To participate in demonstrations and other non-violent actions against the occupation as a bi-national group

From Combatants to Partners for Peace

By Diane Balsler,
National Advocacy Chair, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
and Carinne Luck,
National Director of Chapter and Grassroots Development, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom

It is very difficult these days to be openly identified with peace efforts in the Middle East. Palestinian factions fight intermittently and militants often violate the Palestinian Authority's ceasefire with Israel, while Israel has conducted military operations in the West Bank and has announced plans for the establishment of a new settlement there.

The Palestinian and Israeli members of Combatants for Peace (CFP) have a special understanding of these problems. Formerly sworn enemies, literally dedicated to killing each other in combat, these men were once among the first responders to violence such as that seen over the course of 2006.

Today, however, the roughly 150 Israelis and Palestinians who make up CFP have chosen to lay down arms in favor of coexistence. The Israelis were all once combat soldiers, and the Palestinians were militants, planning or executing attacks on Israeli targets in the name of Palestinian liberation. They now take the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as their model, meeting regularly, discussing their past with brutal honesty, and searching for common ground.

In simple terms, they no longer believe that that the bloodshed with which the two societies have lived for decades can be stopped unless people of good will act together to bring an end to the occupation and stop all forms of violence. As such, they advocate for mutually acceptable negotiations, leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

In this, they act in the best interests of Israelis and Palestinians alike. Neither community will know real peace or stability until such a solution is achieved. Moreover, coexisting Palestinian and Israeli states would open the door to greater regional stability than the Middle East has seen in the modern age – something of great importance to US interests, as well.

The American Jewish community has always been concerned with the future and well-being of Israel. And now, a growing number of American Jews are coming to see the importance of forging a negotiated, two-state resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. CFP is then a natural ally for those who seek a secure future for all the region's people.

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, is currently delighted to sponsor a Combatants For Peace tour to twenty-two American cities because we believe their speakers' messages are vitally important for American audiences to hear. Since 2001 Brit Tzedek has advocated for a Palestinian state next to Israel. We believe that

exposure to the activities and beliefs of organizations like CFP that can help make this dream a reality.

And in spite of – or perhaps because of – the perilous times in which we now live, there has never been a more crucial time for CFP's message to be received. The international community, especially the United States, must truly understand that all parties to the conflict must be heard, and that talks are the only way out of the violence. Brit Tzedek v'Shalom is bringing Combatants for Peace on this national tour so that their eloquent voices, advocating for peace and an end to violence, will resonate across the United States.

We must all recognize that continuing to punish the Palestinian public for their democratically held elections will not solve the problem. In fact, we can see that by reducing the Palestinian people to desperation, the situation has gotten worse. Israel is not served by chaos on its doorstep; American interests will not be met by running street battles in Palestinian cities.

All American Jews should heed the transformative voices of Combatants for Peace. In the past, these men didn't only support the killing – they picked up arms to get the job done. But now they're here to tell the American community: It must stop. Only by ending the occupation, establishing a viable Palestinian state, and stopping all use of violence, can we hope to build peace in the Middle East.

Combatants for Peace can be seen in _____ on [date] _____ at _____ (location). For information call/email the _____ chapter of Brit Tzedek at _____

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, is a national grassroots movement more than 35,000 strong that educates and mobilizes American Jews in support of a negotiated two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Combatants for Peace Find Hope Amidst War

By Ben Murane and Leila Forouzan

For the people of the Middle East, the year just concluded was marked by particular upheaval and pain. In Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, far too many people spent much of 2006 fearing for their lives, from the war in Lebanon to the hostilities in Gaza and the Qassam rockets fired on Israel's south. Though ceasefires are now in place in both areas, those living under the shadow of the violence do not fool themselves – renewed bloodshed may well be just around the corner.

Israel is a society steeped in pride for its soldiers. The failure of the Second Lebanon War to achieve the government's stated war aims came as a real shock to many in the country. Hezbollah is not disarmed; the soldiers whose capture triggered the war have not come home, and if anything, the possibility of yet another war seems more real than ever. It is very easy to give in to hopelessness.

Yet it is possible to find a point of light, a dawning realization that may yet finally lead to peace. If nothing else, both the war in Lebanon and the hostilities across Israel's border with Gaza demonstrate clearly the utter futility of military means to actually solve the conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's call to Mahmoud Abbas to initiate a ceasefire, followed by the first face-to-face meeting between Israeli and Palestinian leadership in eighteen months, indicate that this understanding may in fact have reached the highest reaches of government. The simple power of direct appeals, from one people to the other, must not be underestimated.

It is in this atmosphere that a truly unique group will soon be arriving in the United States from the Middle East. Combatants for Peace is made up of some 150 Israeli and Palestinian men, all once involved in the fighting, who have put aside years of enmity in favor of coexistence.

They do so with the understanding that there is no more time, and no more blood, to be wasted. These brave men come together to tell the tales of their shared past with brutal honesty, and search for common ground. In the words of Palestinian member Bassam Aramin, "We know better than anyone the price of war, and the price of peace."

And so they have set out with little other than their shared will to change hearts and minds. They lecture in Israel and abroad about the transition from a violent struggle; they protest military operations; they work with Palestinians suffering under the current economic sanctions to get food on their tables; they tell their stories, over and over and over again.

It's not easy for any of them. They must often face their own fears, sorrow, and depths of anger over the damage done to their society by what has long seemed an implacable enemy.

Asked recently why he is involved with the organization, Israeli Elik Elhanan – who, in addition to being a combat veteran, lost his sister to a suicide bomber several years

ago -- hesitated. "To get up in the morning?" he finally said, then added, "It gives me enormous hope."

Those of us in the Jewish community for whom Israel's well-being is of primary importance have much to learn from these men. We often struggle among ourselves about the right way to show our support for the Jewish State; we argue over tactics and ideology. Yet the members of Combatants for Peace, each once literally dedicated to the destruction of the other, have found the ability within themselves to move beyond hatred and build a peaceful future.

Truly, these men know the price of war, and yet they have found the gift of enormous hope. After the dreadful year that is now behind us, if we would share that hope, we must listen to their message: not by military might, but only by talking, will we find our way out of war.

Ben Murane and Leila Forouzan are the co-chairs of the New York chapter of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, a national grassroots organization more than 35,000 strong, that educates and mobilizes American Jews in support of a negotiated two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Brit Tzedek is sponsoring a national, 21-city speaking tour of two representatives from Combatants for Peace, who will appear in New York City on January 11th at 7:00 PM at the Village Temple (33 E. 12th Street (between University and Broadway)).

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Website: <http://www.britzedek.org/>

BRING THE SETTLERS HOME

NEW NATIONAL ORGANIZATION CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL AID

WASHINGTON, DC—A campaign to establish an international fund to “bring the settlers home” is the centerpiece of the strategic plan developed by Brit Tzedek v’Shalom (the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace), a pro-Israel, anti-Occupation organization of American Jews which was founded this past spring.

“A recent Peace Now survey shows that almost 80 percent of the settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were attracted to live there by major economic incentives, not by ideological or religious commitment, and we know that the primary incentive was extremely inexpensive, high-quality housing,” said Marcia Freedman, newly elected Board Chair of Brit Tzedek. “Most families wishing to leave and return to live within the old 1967 borders are prohibited from doing so because they cannot afford to buy a comparable home or apartment.”

Brit Tzedek proposes that the international community, led by the United States, establish a fund to make it possible for settlers who choose to leave to do so. “We believe that large numbers of Israeli settlers will take up this offer, perhaps even whole settlements,” Freedman said, “and in this way, one of the major obstacles to a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians could be removed on a voluntary basis by individual acts of unilateral withdrawal.”

In addition to adopting its first strategic plan at a three-day retreat, the board of Brit Tzedek v’Shalom elected its first officers. Marcia Freedman, chair, is an American-born former Member of the Israeli Knesset who resides in the U.S. and in Israel. She is a founder of the Israeli feminist movement and a life-long advocate of a two-state solution to the conflict in the Middle East. Vice-Chair Cherie Brown is the founding director of the National Coalition Building Institute, an organization with thousands of chapters around the world working on issues of racism and anti-Semitism.

“We know that there are tens of thousands of American Jews who agree with us that Israel’s long-term security relies on achieving a just settlement based on two states for two peoples,” said Cherie Brown. “In stage one of our membership drive, we will be reaching out to all of the many Jews who already agree with us. It’s an ingathering of thousands of like-minded Jews.”

Other officers include Treasurer Elliot Figman, executive director of Poets & Writers, the nation’s largest literary nonprofit organization, and Secretary Barry Joseph, a human rights and internet specialist with Global Kids, an educational organization that supports urban youth to be community leaders and global citizens.

The Brit Tzedek board of directors will also launch a campaign to promote inclusivity within the institutions of Jewish communities in cities where it currently has or soon will have chapters. These include Boston, Chicago, New York, Houston, New Haven, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. “Jewish communal life has always consisted of diverse points of view,” said Clare Kinberg, a Brit Tzedek spokesperson, “but external threats make us want to emphasize unity at the cost of honest and needed criticism of the policies of the Israeli government.”

Brit Tzedek v’Shalom is distinguished among American Jewish organizations by a factor that marks significant social change. Its two top officers are women, and more than two-thirds of its board members are women. In most national Jewish organizations in the U.S., women make up a mere 5 percent of the leadership. “I think that the Jewish community will experience not only a new style of leadership,” said Clare Kinberg, “but also a new style of advocacy that relies less on confrontation and more on persuasion.”

To arrange interviews with Brit Tzedek spokespersons, please contact media relations at 510-965-0096, pennskaya@aol.com; or 773-267-0746; cell: 773-793-2515; azbecker@mindspring.com.

N.Y. Liberal Elite Gathers To Back New Peace Group

By NACHA CATTAN
FORWARD STAFF

Members of New York's Jewish cultural and political elite gathered over wine and sushi last week to give a boost to a fledgling peace group that describes itself as "pro-Israel, anti-occupation."

Fundraising heavy hitter Barbara Dobkin of the Jewish Community Center in Manhattan provided her lavishly furnished apartment on the Upper West Side to raise cash for Brit Tzedek V'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Peace and Justice.

The May 22 affair featured feminist icon Gloria Steinem, who delivered the fundraising pitch for the organization, and former Knesset member Marcia Freedman, who introduced the group she helped found. The event raised some \$10,000 among the 90 people who attended, including former Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger, president of the American Jewish World Service, who cut a check for Brit Tzedek.

By remaining sensitive to the Jewish community's concerns for Israel's existence and security needs, Brit Tzedek members say, their group helps carve a place for the many Jews who want, but are afraid, to speak out against Israel's policies. They also say the group was formed to fill a void in America's peace movement, where even some Jewish groups have become increasingly anti-Israel. To maintain its pro-Israel stance, the group will only accept those who support its seven founding principles, particularly its call for a two-state solution.

"This voice isn't heard in the community," Dobkin, founder of Ma'yan, The Jewish Women's Project, told the Forward. "It's very hard in the mainstream Jewish community to say anything critical of Israel without being labeled a traitor. I myself am a Zionist."

But some attendees said that there are already too many American groups urging Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, causing divisions on the left. Although Brit Tzedek members pledged to the audience that they would build coalitions with similar groups, some observers remain skeptical.

"The biggest problem we're facing as progressives is we're all fragmented," said Lilly Rivlin, a vice president of Meretz USA, which supports the leftist Israeli Meretz Party of the same name. "Each one of us is struggling to keep their constituency. For this

organization to really be effective they should not try and duplicate what other organizations are doing. They should really focus only on being a lobby."

Although Rivlin acknowledged that she was "envious" that the organization attracted so many activists to the fundraiser, she said she contributed to the seedling group. She expressed hope that Brit Tzedek will indeed collaborate with others.

Eric Robbins, assistant executive director of the Jewish Community Center of Metrowest in New Jersey, told the Forward: "I wish Americans for Peace Now could reach people [at the fundraiser] so there aren't so many different organizations. I'll absolutely support [Brit Tzedek], but I'd rather there be one place that has the infrastructure to really make a difference. I hope [Brit Tzedek] has a broader perspective that would attract a coalition of large groups."

Freedman, a former member of what is now called Meretz, said Brit Tzedek will strive to work cooperatively with Meretz USA as well as Americans for Peace Now and the fledgling Tikkun Community. She said her organization is unique as an American Jewish peace organization because it has no affiliation to an Israeli government party or voting bloc. "Our message is not constrained by the electoral needs of Israeli parties," Freedman said. Unlike Americans for Peace Now, Brit Tzedek also calls for a withdrawal from East Jerusalem.

About 160 people gathered last month in Washington, D.C., to form the national organization that bills itself as a grass-roots initiative. The group plans to open chapters in several cities and to form student programs on campuses.

Dr. Mandell Ganchrow, the executive vice president of the right-wing Religious Zionists of America, questioned Brit Tzedek's choice to describe itself as pro-Israel, anti-occupation: "It's purely a creation of someone very sensitive to P.R. to try and defuse the criticism that they justly deserve for gathering in the United States and attacking Israel as an occupier. They'll have their two minutes of fame. Gloria Steinem, it's very nice. But at the end of the day, I do not believe this program represents a grass-roots constituency that would in any way, shape or form change the political climate here toward Israel."

The organization is debating whether to affiliate with other Jewish peace groups, which Freedman said is a "problematic" issue because it would entail turning down organizations that don't follow its principles.

Among these principles are an implicit rejection of a Palestinian "right of return" to property in Israel proper. Instead, the organization supports a "just" resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem that respects "the special relationship between the state of Israel and the Jewish people."

"A full 'right of return' [for Palestinian refugees] is an implication of a one-state solution," said Freedman.

Jews for Peace in Palestine and Israel, a Washington-based group that helped plan and publicize Brit Tzedek's founding conference but which calls on Israel to recognize a Palestinian "right of return," is no longer affiliated with the organization. JPPJ's views

may prevent it from affiliating with Brit Tzedek in the future, Freedman said.

"Ideological differences came into play that were respected throughout the process," Freedman said. "They did help out, and we are now completely separate."

In her fundraising pitch to the audience, Steinem said, "Every time we feel unspoken for, it is absolutely worth it to consider what diminishment of that feeling is worth."

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom is a national organization of American Jews deeply committed to Israel's well-being and opposed to its decades-long occupation of land acquired following the 1967 war. We are guided by the mitzvah, or obligation, to pursue peace and justice that is rooted in both secular and religious Jewish traditions. We believe the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians long for an enduring peace and that security for Israel can only be achieved through a negotiated settlement and the establishment of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state.

Brit Tzedek provides a platform for American Jews to articulate their belief that the ongoing conflict threatens Israel's security, severely damages its economy, and erodes the values that underlie a democratic society. We believe that many American Jews share this perspective, but are reluctant to express themselves for fear they may bring harm to Israel and the Jewish people. Through education, advocacy, local chapter activities, and work with the media, we seek to generate greater dialogue within the American Jewish community in order to direct U.S. foreign policy toward the realization of a just peace.

We believe that the following principles and action are required in order to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an equitable and nonviolent way:

- 1.** A complete end to the Israeli military occupation of the territories occupied since 1967 in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem with border adjustments agreeable to both parties.
- 2.** The establishment of a viable Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders alongside Israel with both states guaranteed the ability to maintain secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
- 3.** The establishment and recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states. Such recognition must also insure unfettered access to all religious sites in Israel and in the future Palestinian state to all Jews, Muslims and Christians, regardless of the nationality or sovereignty of the sites.
- 4.** A just resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem that takes into account the needs and aspirations of both peoples. Such a resolution is crucial to achieving a just peace, and therefore must acknowledge Israel's share of responsibility for the plight of Palestinian refugees while also respecting the special relationship between the State of Israel and the Jewish people.
- 5.** The termination of terrorism and state-initiated violence against all individuals with special care being taken to avoid harming civilians. We seek to build a future in which both peoples use non-violent means to resolve social and political inequities.
- 6.** The evacuation of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. These settlements are a major obstacle to peace, a tremendous financial burden to Israel and do little, if anything, to enhance Israel's security. The settlements constantly expose to danger the settlers themselves and the Israeli soldiers sent to defend them, and they bring grave harm to the Palestinians living under Occupation. We call for bringing safely home to Israel the settlers from all settlements except those included as part of a negotiated and mutually agreed upon exchange of territories between Israel and Palestine in determining the final borders of both states.
- 7.** The recognition that as Jews and U.S. citizens, we have a special responsibility to urge our government to pursue policies consistent with the requirement of a just peace for Israel and the Palestinian people.

**Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
Member Registration Form**

Name: _____	Phone (please include area code): Home: _____ Work: _____ Mobile: _____ Fax: _____
Address (including city, state, and zip code): _____ _____ _____	Email: _____ Instant Messenger: _____

Membership (The following dollar amounts are based on the numerical value of each Hebrew letter. Please check off the membership of your choice):

- Chai** - \$18 for life (student /low-income membership) _____
- Double Chai** - \$36 (regular membership) _____
- Triple Chai** - \$54 _____
- Quadruple Chai** - \$72 _____
- Since all of life was created in 6 days - Six Chai** - \$108 _____
- Shalom/Peace Membership** - \$194 _____
- Tzedek/Justice Membership** - \$376 _____

Additional contribution: \$ _____

(Please make your check out to Am Kolel, our interim sponsor. On the memo line of your check, please write: "For Brit Tzedek." All memberships and contributions are tax-deductible.)

Activities What activities are you interested in?

- Lobbying
- Delegations to the Middle East
- Fundraising and Finance
- Web Site
- Education/Training
- Membership/Outreach
- Media
- Networking With Israeli Peace Movement
- Health and human rights for Israelis and Palestinians

(A Brit Tzedek member from the appropriate committee will contact you with information about how you can get involved in these activities.)

Mail to: 2840 Broadway, Suite 351, New York, NY 10025-7898

Email: nyc@btvshalom.org

Thank you for joining Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace.

Moving Forward
Hope and healing, Tikva v'Shalom

Bereaved Families Speak of Tolerance, Reconciliation, and Peace

Yitzhak Frankenthal
Tamara Rabinowitz
and
Dr. Rahib Essawi

Yitzhak Frankenthal is an Orthodox Jew whose 19-year old son, an IDF soldier, was kidnapped and killed by Hamas militants in 1995. Frankenthal was sure there are other bereaved Israeli parents like himself who still believed that peace with the Palestinians was possible. He set about finding those parents, and with them founded the Parents Circle.

Tamara Rabinowitz is a retired Israeli school and university teacher, who after her son's death in 1987 by "friendly fire" in Lebanon created a non-profit shop that helps support the needy in honor of her son.

Dr Rahib Essawi is a professor at Al Quds University who has lost her mother, a brother, and her 17 year-old nephew in the Middle East conflict.

They will tell their personal stories of bereavement and describe their partnership to end the violence in the Middle East. Their hope is to humanize this bloody conflict and thereby build a strong partnership for peace. They are in New York to prove that the cycle of hatred and revenge can be ended and to seek international support for their cause.

Saturday, October 19
Society for the Advancement of Judaism
15 W. 86th Street
7 P.M.

Hosted by Brit Tzedek v'Shalom/Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
www.btvshalom.org

An evening of discussion and organizing on the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict
for

***Brit Tzedek* Members and Their Friends**



What is the role of American Jews in this conflict? What does it mean to care for and support Israel but oppose the occupation? What makes ***Brit Tzedek*** unique as a Jewish peace organization? How can we build an effective New York City chapter of ***Brit Tzedek***? What are ***Brit Tzedek's*** National Campaigns and 5763 membership drive?

Join us for a discussion of these and other questions

with

Marcia Freedman

Former member of the Israeli Knesset
President of the Board of Directors of
Brit Tzedek v'Shalom/The Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace

and NYC *Brit Tzedek* members

David Kurnick

graduate student
member of the ***Brit Tzedek*** NYC chapter coordinating committee

Rabbi Ellen Lippmann

Congregation Kolot Chayenu

Lara Weitzman

consultant and Board member of ***Brit Tzedek***

and moderator

Meredith Tax

writer and Board member of ***Brit Tzedek***

Thursday October 10, 2002

7 PM

West End Synagogue

190 Amsterdam Avenue at 69th Street

Refreshments will be served.

For more information write : nyc@btvshalom.org
and visit the ***Brit Tzedek*** website: www.btvshalom.org



BRIT
TZEDEK
V'SHALOM

JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE & PEACE

Dear Friend:

Thank you for attending *Brit Tzedek v'Shalom/Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace's* recent event of representatives of the Parents' Circle/Bereaved Family Forum. I am sure you'll agree that this was a moving evening and that we need more events like it in support of peace and reconciliation. One way of ensuring future work is by becoming a member of Brit Tzedek. I've enclosed a form and brochures and urge you to join us.

The local NYC Chapter of *Brit Tzedek* will be holding a general meeting on **Monday November 11 from 7 to 9 PM** at the Bronfman Center for Jewish Student Life at 7 East 10th Street (between 5th Avenue and University). It is open to members and non-members; we hope that you'll attend and that you'll bring friends who may be interested in our work.

The meeting will be an opportunity to hear about *Brit Tzedek's* national campaigns, talk politics and meet other members. But perhaps most important, we will be organizing local committees and groups and planning future activities. All of us are very concerned with the recent turn of events in Israel and we believe that *Brit Tzedek* is a good place to discuss them, become more informed and become more active in promoting peace.

I look forward to seeing you there.

B'tzedek v'shalom/In justice and peace,

Irena Klepfisz
Chair, NYC Chapter, *Brit Tzedek*

POB 351
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www.btvshalom.org

Buy the Settlers Out

By MARCIA FREEDMAN

The Palestinians insist that any final settlement to their conflict with Israel must include the establishment of a state in all of the West Bank and Gaza. The current government of Israel, for its part, has shown its reluctance to evacuate any of the estimated 140 settlements. How, then, to reach a settlement on the settlements?

There is a way to break through this seeming impasse which is as simple as it is far-reaching. It wouldn't require American troops, and it would cost less than the aid the United States provides Israel each year. Simply put, the United States should spearhead an international effort to buy these settlers out — whether or not the Israeli government is willing to participate in this endeavor.

Of the 200,000 Israeli settlers who have established residence in the West Bank and Gaza, polling data indicates that the vast majority would relocate either to the large settlement blocs around Tel Aviv and Jerusalem — which the Palestinians have indicated a willingness to accept — or to homes within the pre-1967 borders. A study conducted by Hopp Research for the Israeli organization Peace Now indicates that as many as 60% of the settlers would not only obey a lawful order to evacuate, but would also be "prepared to accept a withdrawal from the settlements in exchange for suitable financial compensation."

The Hopp poll shows that 80% of the settlers currently living in the West Bank relocated in order to improve their quality of life. For the last 20 years, offering Israelis persuasive economic incentives to move to the West Bank and Gaza has been a central policy of successive Likud-led governments. These include tax breaks worth approximately \$4,000 per settler, subsidized down payment and mortgage interest rates, and per capita spending per settler that is more than double that for Israelis living within Israel's pre-1967 borders.

The Hopp study makes it clear that most of the settlers currently living in the West Bank are not zealots; they do not agree with the hardliners who believe that Israel must keep the West Bank and Gaza because either the security of the state of Israel requires it or the coming of the Jewish messiah demands it. Unlike the minority of zealots, most settlers came to the territories in order to escape crowded low-income neighborhoods — to take advantage of a quality-of-life offer they could not resist.

But they now find themselves and their children very much in harms way. The militarization of the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation has exposed them to the attacks of suicide bombers, snipers and deadly infiltrators into their communities and homes. Many want to leave, with or without an Israeli government decision requiring them to evacuate the settlements.

There is evidence that those who can afford it are already voting against the occupation with their feet. According to records of Israel's Central Election Committee, the number of eligible voters in the West Bank is in decline. And during the last election campaign, residents of three West Bank communities made it clear to Labor candidate Amram Mitzna that they wished to leave but could not afford to do so.

An estimated \$2 billion to \$3 billion could remove one of the primary obstacles to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. But only the American government can spearhead this effort to create "facts on the ground" — which would alter the political landscape of the Middle East more decisively than any diplomatic or even military intervention.

Beginning May 7, Israel Independence Day, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, will begin a year-long petition campaign urging the American government to undertake the initiative to buy the settlers out. By backing this effort — and urging their representatives in government to support the initiative — American Jews can throw their political clout behind a practical step forward on the road to peace.

Removing the settlements will not solve the conflict in the Middle East, nor will it completely stem Palestinian violence. But it can succeed in bringing morality back to Israel's pursuit of security.

Marcia Freedman is a former Knesset member, author of "Exile in the Promised Land" and president of Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace.

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FORWARD home page*



Dear Members and Supporters,

We have decided to postpone the national conference until the fall. Please know that the decision to postpone the national conference was very difficult to make. It's disconcerting to change a meeting date, although we hear that many conferences are being cancelled now because of problems due to the war and the economy. In the the long run, however, we think we can pull off a more successful conference by rescheduling. We'll get back to you soon with details for our fall conference and news about the release of our upcoming Campaign to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel.

Thanks for your support,

Aliza Becker, Executive Director

MARK YOUR CALENDARS! Our national conference will be October 31-November 2nd in the Boston or New York area.

Dear Brit Tzedek Members and Supporters,

We are seeking volunteers with diverse skills to work with our Education and Wired Committees. The work of Brit Tzedek is done largely by volunteers. Please read the descriptions below to see if there is a volunteer job that might suit you. We are also seeking a contract Database/Web Application Builder (see below).

EDUCATION COMMITTEE SEEKS MEMBERS FOR STEERING COMMITTEE

The steering committee provides leadership for our national Education Committee. Preferred skills may include: experience developing and/or editing educational materials for a variety of audiences; detailed knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; experience working in Jewish community organizations; research skills; and the ability to complete projects in a timely and professional manner. Steering committee members should be willing to commit 5-10 hours per month including a monthly committee conference call. If interested, contact David Albert at dalbert@mail.la.utexas.edu with a description of your relevant experience and your phone number.

WIRED COMMITTEE SEEKS DATABASE/WEB APPLICATION BUILDER FOR PAID PROJECT POSITION

This project will help us build a web application around our membership database in a timely manner. The prospect must have PHP & MySQL experience and be willing to work long hours in a short time period for a flat non-competitive project rate. Applicants are required to show the Wired Committee existing running applications or demonstrate their skill set in some other way. (Please, do not apply if you are looking to improve your

skills or learn PHP & MySQL) If interested, write <committee@btvshalom.org> with "Database/Web Application Builder" in the subject line. Include a resume and if relevant a URL to your web site.

WIRED COMMITTEE SEEKS VOLUNTEERS FOR VARIOUS POSITIONS

If interested in any of these volunteer positions, please send an email with a description of your background to Wired Committee Chair, Barry Joseph, at <committee@btvshalom.org> and write the volunteer position in the subject line. Please do NOT express your interest by replying to this email.

Graphic Designer:

This volunteer will help us redesign our web site from scratch. We are looking for an experienced graphic designer who has a good sense of type and layout. Legibility is something we want to keep as a primary goal of our new site and we need the right person to help us make sure our designs are useful. Web experience is appreciated but not required. For the next 2-3 months the volunteer should expect to work 15 hours per month, and subsequently 5 hours per month.

Information Architect/Technical Producer:

This volunteer should be a seasoned and polished Information Architect and Producer who can help with architecture and project management of our Many ongoing efforts. This volunteer should be able to work in Visio or similar tools to create both sitemaps and wireframes, coordinate volunteers (up to 5 people per project), and track timelines. The time commitment for this role varies, but the minimum requirement is 5-10 hours per week for the next few months.

Transcriber:

This volunteer will transcribe digital audio recordings of important public events, speeches, and presentations by Brit Tzedek leaders. These transcriptions will produce content for our Web site and material to assist in building the local chapters. Volunteers should be able to work at least three hours a week transcribing these audio files. The individual can be new to transcription but needs to be detail-oriented, a good editor and typist, and have access to a PC with speedy Internet Access.

Listmom:

Brit Tzedek provides listservs for our decentralized chapters and committees to work together and communicate with members. We are currently moving all of our many dozens of lists from Yahoo to a better service and will need additional support to make the transition. We are looking for a volunteer who can contribute about a half hour every other day for the next few months.



BRIT
TZEDEK
V'SHALOM
JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE & PEACE

A CALL TO BRING THE SETTLERS HOME TO ISRAEL

We are American Jews who care deeply about Israel and who are filled with sorrow by the continuous cycle of violence and death in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We call upon the United States government to embrace an initiative which can break through the present stalemate, create a new opening for a negotiated settlement, safeguard the lives of Israeli settlers and remove a major obstacle to peace.

We call upon the United States government:

- to urge the Israeli Government to reverse its longstanding financial inducements to Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and instead to redirect those funds to settlers who are now willing to return to Israel proper;
- to provide generous foreign assistance and to solicit contributions from the European Union, other major industrial democracies and the United Nations for this massive relocation effort, irrespective of whether the Israeli government is ready to participate.

FOR THE SAKE OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY, BRING THE SETTLERS HOME

For the past 35 years, more than 200,000 Israeli citizens have been induced by special economic incentives to settle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A recent comprehensive survey* of settlers found that nearly 80% were motivated by a desire to create better lives for themselves and their families and not by ideological or religious reasons. That dream, however, quickly became a nightmare of constant terror, sniping, murderous incursions into settlements, and suicide bombings. Simultaneously, enormous suffering has been inflicted upon the Palestinian population.

The relentless campaign to settle hundreds of thousands of Israelis amidst millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip threatens the moral foundation of the State. One year after the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion explained to IDF officers the reasons for Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Nearly fifty years later, his speech serves as both warning and grim prophecy.

(over please)

WE NEED YOUR HELP TO BRING THE SETTLERS HOME TO ISRAEL

Please sign the Call and share it with others in your community. In doing so, you will help move Israel one step closer to peace. To sign the Call go to <http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/> or fax/mail the coupon on the reverse side.

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom
Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
P.O. Box 180175
Chicago, IL 60618-0175
<http://www.btvshalom.org>
info@btvshalom.org
773-583-5747 phone
773-583-5772 fax

[I]t was clear that our remaining in Gaza, while the entire world ostracized us would lead to [...] finding ourselves in a hostile sea of terrorism. Our military authorities would have had to shoot terrorists on a daily basis. [...] We would not have been able to withstand this. For the State of Israel, such a reality would have become a catastrophe [...]. Possibly, this would have destroyed us, not militarily, but morally - and in my opinion our morality underpins our very existence.

David Ben-Gurion
Yihud ve-Yi'ud (Tel Aviv) 1971 p. 294
 (Translation:
 Dr. Shai Feldman and Michael Davis)

The settlers have never enhanced Israel's security. On the contrary, their vulnerability to attack has resulted in the loss of nearly a thousand Israeli soldiers and civilians in the last 35 years and hundreds in just the past two years. Those who live on land expected to be negotiated as part of the new State of Palestine – especially those in settlements that are distant from Green Line

Israel and are surrounded by much larger Arab populations – are an obstacle to peace; their continued presence prevents a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

FOR THE SAKE OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMY, BRING THE SETTLERS HOME

The cost of sustaining and protecting the settlers is draining Israel's resources; it limits Israel's ability to provide vital social services, build a stable economy, and ensure peaceful coexistence between the Jews and Palestinian Arabs of Israel. The unending conflict, which the settlers exacerbate, has contributed to a severe economic downturn, a rising rate of unemployment (over 10%), a dramatic decrease in foreign investment, and an increase in the number of Israelis (now 20%) living below the poverty line, including 27% of all children.

PROVIDING SUITABLE COMPENSATION OPENS UP THE POSSIBILITY FOR MANY SETTLERS TO VOLUNTARILY RETURN TO ISRAEL PROPER

A popular misconception claims all settlers would actively resist any attempts to bring them home to Israel; but the same survey* revealed that if a decision is made for withdrawal, a clear majority of settlers is prepared to accept a withdrawal from the settlements in exchange for suitable financial compensation. Undoubtedly, among this majority, there are many if not most who would leave voluntarily even in the absence of a comprehensive settlement were they provided with the financial wherewithal to do so.

*Dr. Micha Hopp, "Settler Attitudes towards Withdrawal from the Territories," July 2002 (Hopp Research Company)
<http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/settlersurvey/>

Yes, I want to add my name to the Call to Bring the Settlers Home to Israel! Contact me to volunteer

Signature: _____ Printed Name: _____

Street Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip code: _____

E-mail address: _____ Telephone: _____

You may NOT use my name publicly.

I want to help promote this important initiative throughout the American Jewish community with a contribution.

My check made payable to "Brit Tzedek v'Shalom" is enclosed.

Charge my Master Card Visa American Express a total of \$ _____

Card number _____ Expiration Date _____

Name on Card (please print) _____

Credit card donations may be faxed to (773) 583-5772 or mail this coupon to:

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom / Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace
 PO Box 180175
 Chicago, IL 60618-0175



BRIT TZEDEK V'SHALOM
JEWISH ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE & PEACE



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VICE-PRESIDENT

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TREASURER

ACTING
DIRECTOR

Aliza Becker

March 10, 2003

Dear Brit Tzedek member,

We're sorry this is so late in happening, but we are now beginning to send our monthly updates to all members for whom we don't have an email address. Enclosed you will find our director Aliza Becker's reports to the membership on what we have accomplished over this period of time. I am sure that you'll agree with me that it's quite a bit.

We will soon be a year old (at the end of April). It's hard to believe that the year has come and gone so quickly. It surely has been a very busy one for all those involved in Brit Tzedek, at the national or the chapter level. We are blessed with countless hours of volunteer time from our members, which is what has made it possible to do so much with so very little staff.

Beginning with this mailing, you will receive monthly updates and other important communications sent to our membership by email. However, if you have an email address and wish to get these messages in that form, please write to us at membership@btvshalom.org and tell us your name and that you are a member and want to be placed on the members' listserv.

Along with these reports, we are enclosing 10 membership brochures for your use. Please distribute them to friends, family or colleagues whom you think might join Brit Tzedek. As you know, it is numbers that will allow us to have influence within the American Jewish community and, thereby, on U.S. foreign policy. If you would like to have additional brochures sent to you, please call the office at the phone number above or send an email to info@btvshalom.org.

Many thanks for your support and your patience,

Marcia Freedman
President



Save the Date! May 16-18, 2003

Brit Tzedek's annual National Conference will be held in the Chicago area on May 16, 17 and 18, Friday evening through Sunday afternoon. Plan now to come to the heartland for an exciting and energizing weekend of learning, sharing, networking and organizing!

Conference details will follow shortly.



Talk Amongst Yourselves: Creating an Open Jewish Dialogue on Israel and the Palestinians

A free workshop in which to talk openly about our simultaneous belief in Israel and discomfort with the Occupation.

Caring about Israel and opposing the Occupation are not in contradiction. In fact, BOTH are critical to achieving a lasting peace. Yet...

- Many of us have found it increasingly difficult to find a place within Jewish communities to express our ambivalence, discomfort or opposition to the Occupation. When we do so our loyalty to and love of the Jewish people is called into question.
- Others have found it equally difficult to voice our concern for Israel's security, survival and well-being. When we do so our commitment to human rights and social justice are called into question. We also fear we will feed anti-Israel or anti-Semitic sentiments.

OUR COMMUNITY MUST NOT CEASE TO ALLOW AND ENCOURAGE THE OPEN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN WHICH OUR TRADITIONS ARE ROOTED. WE MUST REMAIN CONNECTED AND INCLUSIVE.

This workshop is a safe place to express or figure out your positions and feelings on the issues, hear and support others, and gain comfort, skill and strategy for articulating our positions about these complex issues.

*Please join Brit Tzedek v' Shalom
in this important dialogue.*

COST: Free. Contributions welcome!

Sunday, January 19, 2003

10am - 12:30pm

10am - 10:30am Nosh and Chat

10:30am - 12:30pm Workshop

Pre-registration required.

To register or for more information, send your name, phone number and email (if you have one) to: nyc@btvshalom.org or send a note to Brit Tzedek-NYC, POB 351, 2840 Broadway, NYC 10025

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, The Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace is a national organization of American Jews who are pro-Israel and anti-Occupation and who believe in a negotiated settlement to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
www.btvshalom.org

Hosted by The Workmen's Circle
45 East 33rd Street (Park and Madison)



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There is a new voice in the American Jewish community.

Dear Friend,

The past year has been a difficult one for the Jewish people, both in Israel and around the world. The suicide attacks in Israel and the rise in anti-Semitic incidents and sentiment have fostered an atmosphere of siege that is exacerbated by pronouncements from many Jewish leaders, both here and in Israel, who claim that the survival of the Jewish people and the state of Israel is threatened, and that American Jews must all line up in lock-step with the policies of the current government of Israel. Their insistence upon uncritical loyalty and blind solidarity has created a climate in which exchanging diverse points of view, questioning established wisdom, and discussing Middle East politics, the norm in our community, has been made difficult, if not impossible.

In this environment, many of us who strongly back Israel but support a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the evacuation of the settlements, and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel have begun to lose hope.

But there IS hope. Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace, has been established in order to create a mass, chapter-based membership organization with a new voice of reason and hope, a voice that calls for an end to the Israeli occupation and an end to violent resistance by the Palestinians, a voice that calls for a two-state solution to the conflict, a voice that rejects Arafat's waffling and the nihilism and bankruptcy of the policies of Sharon, a voice that calls for the re-engagement of the U.S. in achieving a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Yes, there IS hope. But to influence the American Jewish community and U.S. foreign policy, we must attract first tens of thousands and then hundreds of thousands of members *as soon as possible.* The situation, we all know, is critical, and it may soon become explosive. There is no time to waste.

If this message resonates with you, *you must join NOW.* Together, we can speak forcefully for all of us who believe that a just and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict *is* still within reach and needs to be a priority of U.S. foreign policy. Building that clout has to happen one person at a time. *It is all in your hands.* If you agree with our positions and respond by joining, *you become part of the hope.*

There IS hope. There are signs of new, peace-oriented leadership emerging among the Palestinians and the Israelis, and both peoples will be holding elections this winter. The recent Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement provides a new platform from which the Israeli peace movement, the American Jewish peace

over, please

movement and Israeli and Palestinian leaders committed to a two-state solution can work. (Sari Nusseibeh is president of Al-Quds University and represents the PLO in Jerusalem; Ami Ayalon is a former head of the Israeli Security Service.) Further, the chorus of voices critical of the Bush administration's failure to prioritize the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is growing.

In this Jewish year 5763, become one of the 5763 new members we need to attract in the next few months. Become the core of a mass movement to change the face of the American Jewish community's response to the bloody Israeli-Palestinian stalemate.

Add your voice, and brighten the beacon of hope.

This Hannukah choose peace,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Marcia Freedman". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Marcia Freedman
President